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Malicious applications pose an enormous security threat to mobile computing devices.    
Currently 85% of all smartphones run Android, Google’s open-source operating system, 
making that platform the primary threat vector for malware attacks.  Android is a 
platform that hosts roughly 99% of known malware to date, and is the focus of most 
research efforts in mobile malware detection due to its open source nature.  One of the 
main tools used in this effort is supervised machine learning.  While a decade of work has 
made a lot of progress in detection accuracy, there is an obstacle that each stream of 
research is forced to overcome, feature selection, i.e., determining which attributes of 
Android are most effective as inputs into machine learning models. 
 
This dissertation aims to address that problem by providing the community with an 
exhaustive analysis of the three primary types of Android features used by researchers: 
Permissions, Intents and API Calls.  The intent of the report is not to describe a best 
performing feature set or a best performing machine learning model, nor to explain why 
certain Permissions, Intents or API Calls get selected above others, but rather to provide a 
holistic methodology to help guide feature selection for Android malware detection. 
 
The experiments used eleven different feature selection techniques covering filter 
methods, wrapper methods and embedded methods.  Each feature selection technique 
was applied to seven different datasets based on the seven combinations available of 
Permissions, Intents and API Calls.  Each of those seven datasets are from a base set of 
119k Android apps.  All of the result sets were then validated against three different 
machine learning models, Random Forest, SVM and a Neural Net, to test applicability 
across algorithm type.   
 
The experiments show that using a combination of Permissions, Intents and API Calls 
produced higher accuracy than using any of those alone or in any other combination and 
that feature selection should be performed on the combined dataset, not by feature type 
and then combined.  The data also shows that, in general, a feature set size of 200 or 
more attributes is required for optimal results.  Finally, the feature selection methods 
Relief, Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) and Recursive Feature Elimination 







Based on the proposed methodology and experiments, this research provided insights into 
feature selection – a significant but often overlooked issue in Android malware detection. 
We believe the results reported herein is an important step for effective feature evaluation 
and selection in assisting malware detection especially for datasets with a large number 
of features. The methodology also has the potential to be applied to similar malware 
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Introduction     
Background 
Smartphones have become ubiquitous during this past decade and have come to 
store more and more of their owner’s personal data, going well beyond simple contact 
and social media data but including much more sensitive and private information such as 
usernames and passwords for access to financial sites as well as payment information 
itself such as credit card and bank account numbers.  During this time the predominant 
mobile platforms have resolved down to two systems: Android and Apple (iOS).   
Android, owned by Google, now has 85% of the world market share according to IDC, an 
industry leading technology research firm (Scarsella, Reith, Chau, & Shirer, 2018)  
Apple’s iOS has the remaining 15% market share with all other platforms being 
negligible.  
Android 
Google’s mobile operating system was originally developed by a company of the 
same name, Android, started by Andy Rubin, a former engineer at Apple (Welcome to 
the definitive Android Central take on the history of Google's OS, 2015).  It was built 
based on the Linux kernel for convenience of getting device drivers, memory 
management, process management, networking and security with minimal effort.  Google 
purchased Android (the company) in 2005 and later released the first commercial device 




of the first iPhone.  In a step that turned out to be extremely important, Google also open-
sourced it as the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). 
At the time, the dominant mobile phone operating system was Symbian at almost 
50% market share, used by Samsung, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Nokia and other smaller 
players (Global mobile OS market share in sales to end users from 1st quarter 2009 to 
2nd quarter 2017, 2018).   In second place was Blackberry OS by RIM at 20% and third 
place was a tie between Windows Phone by Microsoft and iOS on Apple’s iPhone, both 
at 10%.  With Android being open source, it was adopted by several manufacturers and 
started to experience phenomenal growth.  By mid-2010 it overtook iOS and today is the 
dominant player at 85% share of the mobile market. 
Applications are the essence of what makes smartphones “smart”.  Google, Apple 
and other third-party developers use “app stores” as convenient online sources for free 
and paid apps, easily accessible by users who can download and install apps on their 
device with no outside assistance.  The official Google app store is Google Play.  As of 
the end of the first quarter of 2020, there were over 2.9 million apps available on Google 
Play (Number of Android applications, 2020).   
As mentioned earlier, Android is built on top of a modified Linux kernel.  As 
shown in Figure 1 there are three additional architectural layers, Native Libraries and 
Runtime environment, the App Framework, and Applications. 
The Linux kernel acts as the hardware abstraction layer and provides the basic 
computing infrastructure.  The next layer up has two segments.  The Native Libraries 
which provide key services with examples being media, audio and database management.  




which is the equivalent of a JVM (Java Virtual Machine) except written specifically for 
Android.  It runs Dex files, which are the byte code files that come from compiling Java 
classes and JAR files for Android.  ART replaced the Dalvic VM from earlier versions of 
Android.  Also in the Runtime environment are the core libraries which provide the basic 
Java package and associated utilities. 
The next level up is the App Framework which provides all the service 
“managers” for applications, such as the Telephony Manager and Location Manager.  
These are built around four major components: activities, services, broadcast receivers 
and content providers. 
Activities are essentially a user interface (UI).  It represents a single screen, so an 
app may have many different activities with each being independent from the others.  







Services are for keeping an app running in the background to perform long-
running operations such as playing music while the user does something else on the 
device.   Services do not have UIs (activities) and as with activities, services are launched 
using Intents.   
Broadcast Receivers are used to broadcast messages to the system or other apps 
allowing them to react to events such as a text message being received, or the screen 
being turned off.  Like services they have no UI and are launched using Intents. 
Content Providers manage a shared set of app data (or data-store) for situations 
where apps want to share their data with other apps, such as Contacts being available to 
the email app or phone app.  UIs are handled by the app making use of the content 
provider (Faruki, et al., 2015; Application Fundamentals, 2020). 
The top layer in the Android stack (Figure 1) is that of Applications.  Apps are 
written in the programming languages Java and/or Kotlin.  To access the lower layers of 
the stack, apps use Intents, as discussed above, as well as Permissions, with all being 
programmed using the exposed Android APIs. 
Permissions are a key part of Android often playing a significant role in malware 
detection.  The purpose of a Permission is to protect the privacy and data of the user. 
Apps must request permission to access certain sensitive user data such as text messages 
and contacts, as well as various system components such as the camera, microphone, and 
network.  Depending on the Permission level, Android might grant the permission 
automatically or might prompt the user to approve or disapprove the request. 
Android categorizes all Permissions into four categories: normal, dangerous, 




Normal - Permissions that have minimal risk to the user, system or device and are 
granted by default at install time.  They protect access to APIs that can cause no harm 
such as installing a shortcut. 
Dangerous - Permissions considered as high risk given their capability of 
accessing private data and important sensors on the device.  Users must accept or decline 
an app’s ability to use a dangerous Permission as the app is being installed.  These 
Permissions protect access to APIs that could cause harm, like those related to spending 
money or collecting private data.  Examples would include the ability to read text 
messages or record audio. 
Signature - Permissions that are granted only if the requesting app is signed by the 
same certificate authority as the app that defined the permission.  Given that security 
check, they are granted automatically at the install time and are available with the system 
apps.  APIs that require such permission level include accessing voicemail, NFC and 
VPN, among others. 
Special - Permissions are system level and labeled “Not for use by 3rd party 
apps.”  Examples include the APIs granting access to system alerts and writing settings 
(Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song, & Wagner, 2011; Tam, Feizollah, Anuar, Salleh, & Cavallaro, 
2017; Permissions Overview, 2019). 
Intents are another important piece of the Android OS.  An Intent is a messaging 
component for requesting an action from another app component.  Three fundamental use 
cases are: starting an activity, starting a service and initiating a broadcast.  They are used 




who may send certain intents to prevent apps from mimicking them (Felt, Chin, Hanna, 
Song, & Wagner, 2011). 
There are two types of Intents: explicit and implicit. 
Explicit – Intents that specify precisely which app will be used.  Known as early 
binding, this type is typically used to start a component within the same app such as 
starting a new activity in response to a user action, or start a service. 
Implicit – Known as late binding, it does not name a specific component but 
rather declares an action to perform for which a component from another app can 
manage.  An example is an app that wants to display a location on a map might use an 
implicit Intent to request that some other app capable of performing that function show 
the specified location on a map (Intents and Intent Filters, 2019). 
Android’s tremendous marketshare and open architecture make it a popular target 
for malicious apps.  Security firm AV-Test reports that over the last three years there was 
an average of 5.9 million new malicious apps per year specifically targeting Android 
(AV-Test Malware Statistics, 2019).  The malware covers a large range of nefarious 
processes aimed at mobile devices, from stealing users’ most sensitive information to one 
of the most popular today - running botnets for crypto-currency mining (Samani & Davis, 
2019).   
The popularity also means that Google Play, the app store, is a key threat vector.  
Google took steps to address the problem in 2012 by deploying to Google Play a 
scanning tool called Bouncer to help detect malware, but according to Hou (2012) there 
was minimal impact due to the limited scope of the scan.  Five years later in 2017, 




protection (Amadeo, 2017) but according to an analysis by Computerworld, all the 
services announced as part of Play Protect were already part of Play Store and Android 
for some time past (Raphael, 2017), so once again there was minimal impact.  A recent 
comparison of different antivirus products on Android by an independent test lab rated 
Play Protect last among twenty products tested (The best antivirus software for Android, 
2018). 
Threat Detection 
In classic intrusion detection as well as mobile malware detection, approaches are 
classified as either signature-based or anomaly-based.  As described by Garcia-Teodoro, 
Diaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández and Vázquez (2009), signature-based systems look for 
defined patterns, or signatures within the app and compare to a signature database of 
known attacks.  Anomaly-based systems attempt to model the “normal” behavior of a 
system and generate an anomaly alert whenever the difference between an observation 
and the normal behavior exceeds some predefined threshold.   
Within the world of anomaly-based detection, another stratification of techniques 
relates to how the analysis is accomplished.  Detection of malware happens by either 
examining its code or by executing it in a safe environment (Gandotra, Bansal, & Sofat, 
2014).  The former is known as static analysis.  With static analysis, the executable app 
(in Android referred to as an APK file) first has to be decompiled into source code and 
that code is analyzed for patterns that indicate malware or not.  The latter is known as 
dynamic analysis.  Dynamic analysis occurs with the app running and monitors things 
like information flow, function calls, etc., with the goal of observing what the app does 




Garcia-Teodoro, et al., further categorize anomaly-based systems as either: 1) 
statistical-based, which is focused on stochastic behavior, 2) knowledge-based, which 
requires availability of prior knowledge and/or data, or 3) machine learning-based, which 
is essentially a categorization of patterns.  The third one is of interest here and is explored 
in more detail in the next section. 
Machine Learning 
Machine learning techniques can be mapped to three primary scenarios: 1) 
situations where examples of data are available that provide the input and the output, 2) 
situations where only the input data is available and 3) situations where only the input 
data is available but there is a feedback loop indicating the quality of the prediction  
(Lison, 2015).  The three cases are generally referred to as: supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning, respectively. 
Considering the problem of malware detection with respect to these three, 
reinforcement learning has yet to be shown as an effective tool given the nature of the life 
cycle of malware.  “Reinforcement” would require someone identifying that they had 
installed malware and feeding that back into the detection engine, which implies the 
event to be prevented, installing malware, had already occurred and that the user would 
know that and report it.  Interestingly it is being used to attack malware detection as 
described by Anderson, Kharkar, Filar, Evans and Roth (2018), and Fang, Wang, Li, Wu, 
Zhou and Huang (2019), where they demonstrate the use of reinforcement learning 
against dynamic analysis and static analysis respectively. 
Unsupervised learning has low applicability as a stand-alone approach to malware 




low false positives.  However, it is often used in feature engineering where the goal is to 
understand the structure of various features in an application (Machine Learning for 
Malware Detection, 2019).  This understanding is then applied to feature selection to be 
used in supervised models such as demonstrated by Verma and Muttoo (2016) who used 
the unsupervised technique of K-means clustering to limit the number of features to be 
analyzed by a supervised approach using Decision Trees. 
Supervised learning as described by Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014) is 
"using experience to gain expertise," by having a training example that has key 
information that is missing from other test data, or data of interest in the wild.  This key 
information, typically referred to as labels on the data, is used to teach or supervise the 
learner by providing the answers to how the model should predict based on input.  The 
model is then applied to unlabeled data to make predictions without having the answers a 
priori. 
In supervised learning, target predictions can be characterized as either 
quantitative or qualitative, where the quantitative variables have numerical values and 
qualitative variables have values in one of n different classes, or categories (James, 
Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017).  These two approaches are generally referred to as 
regression versus classification respectively.  Regression approaches aim to predict 
values along a continuous output variable.  Examples include a stock price, the value of a 
house, and a person’s income.  Classification approaches aim to predict values of discreet 
output variables.  Examples of classification variables include email type (spam or not 
spam), whether a person will default on a loan (yes or no), whether a patient has cancer 




There are a number of approaches, or algorithms, for supervised machine 
learning.  Following is a list and brief description of the supervised machine learning 
classifiers that are most widely used today. (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017; 
Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014) 
Support Vector Machine (SVM):  A linear method of classification in which data 
is defined as points in an n-dimensional space (where n is the number of features). 
The model defines a hyperplane that optimally separates (classifies) all of the data 
points onto one side or the other of the hyperplane. 
Bayesian Networks:   An algorithmic applications of Bayes theorem resulting in a 
probabilistic graphical model representing the relationships between several 
random variables, or features. 
Naïve Bayes:  Another probabilistic classifier based on Bayes theorem but with a 
significant restriction.  The “naïve” moniker is due to the fact that it assumes that 
the presence of a particular feature in a class is unrelated to the presence of any 
other feature. 
Decision Trees:  Classification models in the form of a tree structure where data 
points are broken down into smaller and smaller subsets as an associated decision 
tree is incrementally developed as an “if-then” rule set.  The resulting structure 
has branches and leaves where branches represent a decision node and leaves 
represent a classification node. 
K-nearest Neighbor:  An instance-based algorithm in which data is defined as 




number of instances (nearest neighbors) to that point are analyzed and the most 
common class of those are the prediction or classification of the new data point. 
Logistic Regression:  Regardless of the regression term in the name, it is a 
classification algorithm.  It transforms n features using the logistic function, most 
often using a sigmoid curve, to a probability output from 0 to 1 which can then be 
interpolated into binary results. 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN):  Models that are inspired by the structure of 
biological neural networks.  They consist of a set of connected input/output units 
in two or more layers where each connection has a weight associated with it that 
gets tuned in the training phase to adapt the network to the particular problem at 
hand. 
Ensemble methods are machine learning techniques that combines several models 
such as just described in order to produce an even better predictive model.  The following 
four techniques are ensemble methods used in conjunction with one or more of the 
previously described algorithms. 
Random Forest:  An ensemble technique for supervised learning classification 
that works by constructing a multitude of decision trees.  The final classification 
is the mode of the classes (classification) of the individual trees.  
Adaptive Boosting:  Also known as AdaBoost, it is used with many different 
machine learning algorithms but typically with only one type per model.  It is a 
sequential ensemble method where the output of those algorithms, referred to as 
weak learners, are combined into a weighted sum that represents the final output 




Bootstrap Aggregation:  Also known as Bagging, this technique can also be used 
with many different machine learning algorithms but typically with only one type 
per model.  It is a parallel ensemble method that uses bootstrap sampling of the 
dataset to construct many independent models using the weak learners and 
aggregating those results into a final classification. 
Stacking: An ensemble method that uses multiple different machine learning 
algorithms in a single model.  The various algorithms use the same dataset, and 
their output is fed into yet another machine learning algorithm as a meta-model.  
This meta-model will take the outputs of the weak learners as inputs and develop 
a final classification. 
When trying to decide between machine learning approaches (algorithms) one 
obvious candidate for including in the selection criteria is performance.  Caruana and 
Niculescu-Mizil (2006) performed a large-scale empirical comparison of several 
supervised learning algorithms using eight performance criteria.  Comparing machine 
learning techniques in general can be problematic given the tendency for some techniques 
to perform better in certain problem domains, so this study used eleven different 
classification problems and associated datasets.  The datasets were diverse including 
census data, medical imaging, particle physics, text recognition and biological data. 
The machine learning techniques under study were Decision Trees, SVMs, 
Logistic regression, Naïve Bayes, ANN and K-nearest Neighbor along with three 
ensemble methods on Decision Trees: Random Forests, Bagged Decision Trees and 
Boosted Decision Trees.  The performance criteria included threshold metrics, 




and lift.  The second included area under the ROC curve (Receiver operating 
characteristic), average precision, and precision/recall breakeven point.  The probability 
metrics were squared error (Root Mean Square) and cross-entropy. 
A summary of the results of their testing is presented in Table 1.  It is interesting 
to note that for all performance metrics, which includes all the problem domains under 
study, the three ensemble methods dominated the top three positions.  Considering non-
ensemble techniques, SVMs and Neural Nets performed best, again across all 
performance metrics.  Conversely, the lowest performers were consistently Logistic 
Regression and Naïve Bayes. 
Kotsiantis, Zaharakis and Pintelas (2007) analyzed a number of supervised 
learning techniques that also included Decision Trees, SVMs, Naïve Bayes, ANN and K-
nearest Neighbor, but no ensemble methods.  A normalized summary of their data is 
presented in Table 2.  This study has more qualitative commentary and performance 
criteria related to speed compared to the prior study, but the first column does address 
accuracy.  In that metric, SVMs and Neural Nets are cited as the top performers, which 
directly coincides with the results of the Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil work when not 
Table 1 





considering ensemble techniques.  Both studies also have Naïve Bayes as the lowest 
performer. 
Feature Selection 
In machine learning, features are individual independent measurable properties or 
characteristics that act as input into the model.  For example, a machine learning model 
used to predict the probability of rain might have features such as the outside 
temperature, wind speed and humidity.  Complex models can contain large numbers of 
input features, hundreds and even thousands. 
Feature selection is the process of selecting a subset of relevant features for use in 
construction of machine learning models.  In their seminal work on the subject, Guyon 
and Elisseeff (2003) described three reasons to focus on improving feature selection: 1) 
higher model accuracy, 2) faster model performance and 3) better understanding of the 
model itself.  They went on to suggest that researchers with sufficient time and 
computational resources should “compare several feature selection methods, including 
[…] new idea[s]” and approaches. 
According to Liu, et al. (2005), the goals of feature selection in machine learning 
are: 
• Reducing dimensionality,  
Table 2  





• Removing irrelevant and redundant features,  
• Reducing the amount of data needed for learning,  
• Improving algorithms’ predictive accuracy, and  
• Increasing the constructed models’ comprehensibility 
There are a number of approaches to feature selection.  One that can be best 
described as exhaustive search is exemplified by the work of Sung and Mukkamala 
(2003) in which to select the most effective features of the classic KDD dataset 
(Lippmann, Haines, Fried, Korba, & Das, 2000) they removed variables one-by-one and 
reran their models each time determining the accuracy based on all features minus the 
one removed.  This technique inherently assumes complete independence of attributes. 
Another approach is to use heuristics, such as that by Li, Ge and Dai (2015) 
where they relied on the Android categorization of Permissions, using only the ones 
labeled as “Dangerous Permissions” (Permissions Overview, 2019).  Using heuristics 
requires domain knowledge.  In this instance, the authors understand how Google labels 
groups of permissions and decided that based on their domain knowledge the use of that 
subgroup of Permissions was appropriate. 
A third, and the most common approach to feature selection, is called filter 
methods, which use a statistical measure to assign a score to each feature and who’s 
ranking ultimately determines if they are used or not.  The methods are often univariate 
and consider the features independently.  As examples, Chan and Song (2014) used 
information gain theory in their feature selection of Android Permissions and API calls.  
Tsang, Kwong and Wang (2007) performed a comparison of analysis techniques 




A fourth technique is called wrapper methods which treat feature selection as a 
search problem.  Some predictive model is used to evaluate a combination of features and 
assign a score based on model accuracy.  Various search techniques can be employed.  
As an example, Wang, Wang, Feng, Liu, Han and Zhang (2014) used forward selection 
which is an iterative approach with each iteration adding the feature which best improves 
the model. 
A feature selection approach referred to as embedded methods attempts to learn 
which features best contribute to the accuracy of the model while the model is being 
created. Of these approaches, the most common are regularization methods that introduce 
additional constraints into the optimization of a predictive algorithm in order to bias the 
model towards lower complexity.  Nezhadkamali, Soltani and Seno (2017) used one of 
the more popular regularization algorithms, LASSO or L1 regularization, in their 
comparison with various filter methods.   
A variation on feature selection is often referred to as feature learning.  The goal 
with this approach is to allow a system to automatically discover what feature 
representations are needed for accurate classification and more specifically some number 
of representations that is significantly less than the original number of features in the raw 
data.  One of the more popular techniques for this dimensionality reduction approach is 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA).  PCA is an unsupervised algorithm that creates 
linear combinations of the original features ranked in order of variance allowing a subset, 
amounting to the most important, to be selected thereby reducing the number of features.  




feature set of Android Permissions to define the attributes for input into a Support Vector 
Machine as the primary classifier. 
K-means clustering is another popular approach for dimensionality reduction. 
This unsupervised technique tries to find k-clusters of the data by minimizing the square 
error function.  The new attributes are then represented by the centroids of the clusters.  
K-means can be computationally expensive, so in an interesting variation, Napoleon and 
Pavalakodi (2011) used PCA on their high-dimensional dataset first and then applied K-
means clustering for further reductions. 
An approach that has gained significantly in popularity of late is the use of Neural 
Networks.  This is often referred to as deep learning, but some use the term deep learning 
simply to imply the use of multi-layer, deep, Neural Networks.   
There are a number of variations in the use of Neural Networks for dimensionality 
reduction.  In one such, with respect to Android malware detection, Su, Zhang, Li and 
Zhao (2016) used a Neural Network based on a Deep Belief Network (DBN) for feature 
learning against Permissions and API calls with the selected features then used for input 
into a Support Vector Machine for classification.  They reported improved results to other 
published ML techniques but had no direct comparison.  Nix and Zhang (2017) also used 
a Neural Net, specifically a Deep Neural Network (DNN) to automatically learn features 
on Android APKs.  They restricted their feature types to API calls only and on sequences 
thereof as opposed to existence.  Results were compared to the use of SVM and Naïve 
Bayes on the same dataset and showed a higher accuracy. 
Duc and Giang (2018) used a Neural Network model based on a Multilayer 




2019), API calls, app components, hardware used and URLs.  The results, compared to 
prior published results on the same dataset using an SVM, were mixed showing a higher 
precision but a lower recall.  In a similar study Wang, Zhao and Wang (2018) used 
variations of a Convolution Neural Network (CNN) for feature learning also including 
the feature types: Permissions, Intents, API calls and hardware used.  Their results were 
compared to the same dataset run on an SVM,  Decision Tree, Random Forest and K-
nearest Neighbor and showed an increase in accuracy. 
Android Features 
Feature selection starts by defining what set or type of features will be used in the 
model.  For example, with respect to Android malware detection using static analysis, the 
input could be limited to just Android Permissions with the idea being that the selection 
process will determine, of all the Permissions available in the Android OS, which ones 
should be used in the machine learning classifier.   
A survey was conducted by this author on research related to Android malware 
detection using static analysis and machine learning.  Over the 71 publications reviewed, 
there was a total of eleven different Android features used, some using just a single 
feature type, others using multiple.  Table 3 shows a metadata analysis of features used.  
By far, the most common attribute type used are Permissions, with 82% of the 
publications describing their use.  Second is API calls with just over 50% including that 
feature, and third are Intents at 24%.  The remaining eight features are used much more 
sparsely as shown in the table. 
 It is also interesting to note that most researchers do not detail the features used.  




to know precisely which ones are important.  The same can be said for other features 
such as Intents of which there are 295 Intents defined in Android, and there are hundreds 
of variations on API calls given the hierarchical nature of API definitions. 
Problem Statement 
This variety in approaches to static analysis points to a problem in the academic 
and commercial arena of Android malware detection; there is a lack of agreement 
regarding what Android feature set is most effective for detecting zero-day attacks with 
machine learning techniques.  Not only is there significant disagreement on the categories 
of Android features that are effective (Permissions, API Calls, etc.) but there are 
hundreds of discrete attributes in those categories and there is no consistency in which 
discrete attributes of the categories are effective.  Using Permissions as an example, there 
are 158 different Permissions defined in Android.  Some researchers just use the subset 
that Google classifies as "dangerous".  In other cases, the Permissions subset was hand 
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selected based on the researchers' domain knowledge.  And often, the dataset in question 
is simply run through some selection method such as Information Gain, and results are  
blindly accepted as the most important subset to apply.  In large part this inconsistency in 
approach is due to the fact that there is no definitive study to provide guidance to 
researchers who desire to get past the task of feature selection and work on innovative 
next-step approaches in detection. 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this research is to advance the state of the industry’s knowledge on 
feature sets used for Android static analysis malware detection.  Figure 2 presents the 
evaluation framework of the approach.  The column on the left labeled as Original 
Figure 2  





Feature Sets represents all possible combinations of the three groups of features under 
evaluation: Permissions, Intents and APIs.  Given that the research community uses 
various combinations of these, as demonstrated earlier, then using each combination as a 
starting feature provides the broadest possible domain coverage. 
 The second column, labeled  Feature Subset Selection, depicts the categories of 
feature selection techniques used: two filter method approaches, univariate and 
multivariate, wrapper methods and embedded methods.  Each category represents one or 
more algorithms employed to create a feature subset for each of the original feature sets 
from the first column. 
This provides a broad set of top-level feature subsets representing every possible 
combination of the original feature sets and the feature selection techniques.  In terms of 
concrete numbers, there are seven original feature sets and eleven feature selection 
algorithms across the four defined categories which equals 77 different feature subsets.  
Within these top-level subsets, feature importance is determined by the weights assigned 
by each algorithm in addition to comparison to random columns of data included in each 
dataset.  The point of this latter aspect is that regardless of a feature's reported weight, if 
it cannot predict better than features consisting of random data, it should be discarded.  
Finally, subsets of the important features (top five, top ten, etc.) are created to look at the 
effect of feature count.  As detailed later, this resulted in 615 unique feature subsets. 
The third column, Feature Set Validation, is where each of the 615 feature subsets 
are used as input into three different different machine learning algorithms.  Thus, there 




This approach significantly adds to a very limited amount of feature selection 
knowledge in the Android space by providing a robust analysis of the key feature types 
and providing detailed result sets naming the specific attributes that prove to be most 
relevant for the various machine learning algorithms. 
Note that it was not a goal of the research to find a best performing feature set or a 
best performing machine learning model, nor to explain why certain Permissions, Intents 
or API Calls get selected above others.  
Research Questions 
1. How does feature ranking vary when Permissions, Intents and API Calls are selected 
separately versus combined? 
2. How does feature ranking vary across feature selection algorithms? 
3. How does machine learning model accuracy vary across machine learning algorithms 
and feature selection algorithms? 
4. How does feature set size affect model accuracy across feature selection methods? 
5. Among Permissions, Intents and API Calls, what are the important features? 
Relevance and Significance 
As discussed in the section Feature Selection, the importance of selecting the 
most appropriate features for machine learning algorithms cannot be overstated.  To date, 
no one has taken a systematic approach to evaluation of features in the Android malware 
detection arena.  This research is the first. 
The shear variation in approach by the research community as documented 




problem.  In addition, most feature selection studies publish the results strictly in terms of 
malware detection capability, not the actual list of features, just the category used.  This 
research not only publishes the performance results, but the details of which features 
were selected by the various methods providing a significant reference to future 
researchers. 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
1. The scope of the investigation is limited to Android Permissions, Intents and API 
Calls. 
2. The scope of the investigation is limited to eleven feature selection methods (detailed 
in the Methodology section). 
3. The scope of the investigation is limited to three machine learning algorithms 
(detailed in the Methodology section). 
Definition of Terms 
Accuracy: The fraction of predictions a machine learning model predicts correctly. 
Android application package (APK): The package file format used by the Android 
operating system for distribution and installation of applications. 
Application Programming Interface (API): A set of definitions and protocols for 
integrating software components or applications.  
Area Under the Curve (AUC): Measures the quality of a machine learning model's 
predictions irrespective of the classification threshold, with the curve being the 




Artificial Neural Network (ANN): Models that are inspired by the structure of 
biological neural networks  consisting of a set of connected input/output units in 
two or more layers where each connection has a weight associated with it that gets 
tuned in the training phase to adapt the network to the particular problem at hand. 
Classification and Regression Tree (CART): A decision tree that can perform 
classification and regression. 
Classifier: A machine learning model that is trained to classify its input into n number of 
distinct classes.  
Control Flow Graph (CFG): A graphical representation of all execution paths possible 
for a running software application. 
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN): A Neural Network algorithm which can input 
an image, assign importance to various aspects in the image and be able to 
differentiate one from another.  
Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS): A feature selection algorithm that takes a 
basis set of feature correlations and compares inter-feature correlation and each 
features’ correlation with the class label vector to select a feature subset. 
Crossover: An operator in evolutionary computing, inspired by the concept of sexual 
reproduction in which two genomes combine traits to produce children containing 
a mixture of both sets of traits. 
Dataset: For supervised learning, it is a collection of input values (X) and the labeled 





Decision Tree (DT): A machine learning model in the form of a tree structure where data 
points are broken down into smaller and smaller subsets as an associated decision 
tree is incrementally developed as an “if-then” rule set.  The resulting structure 
has branches and leaves where branches represent a decision node and leaves 
represent a classification node. 
Deep Belief Network (DBN):  An unsupervised Neural Network that uses probabilities 
to produce outputs.  They consist of multiple layers of latent variables, with 
connections between the layers but not between components within each layer. 
Deep Learning: Neural network architectures that uses multiple layers (three or more) to 
extract higher level features from the initial input data. 
Deep Neural Network (DNN): A neural network with three or more layers. 
Evolving Clustering Method (ECM): A machine learning distance-based clustering 
method for dynamic clustering of an input stream of data in a single pass.  
F-measure: Also known as F1 score or F-score is the harmonic mean of Recall and 
Precision. 
False Negative (FN): In the case of malware detection, an outcome where a malicious 
app (positive) is classified as benign (negative). 
False Positive (FP): In the case of malware detection, an outcome where a benign app 
(negative) is classified as malicious (positive). 
False Positive Rate (FPR): The proportion of actual negative outcomes that a machine 
learning model predicts incorrectly. 
Feature Engineering: The technique of creating new features from the original features 




Feature Importance: A mathematical representation of the importance of an individual  
feature in a machine learning model relative to the other features. 
Feature Selection: The process of choosing the most important features of a machine 
learning model and creating a feature subset. 
Feature Vector: The set of inputs to a machine learning model expressed as a vector. 
Feature: An individual value from the feature vector.   
Fuzzy C-means Method (FCM):  A machine learning clustering algorithm that allows 
one piece of data to belong to two or more clusters. 
Genetic Algorithm (GA):  An evolutionary computing model inspired by biological 
systems, specifically evolution.  It develops a group of possible solutions to a 
classification problem and evolves them using a fitness function until an 
optimized solution resolves. 
KDD dataset: A network intrusion dataset from the 1999 KDD Cup annual competition 
hosted by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 
K-nearest Neighbor (KNN): An instance-based algorithm in which data is defined as 
points in an n-dimensional space.  When a new data point arrives, the closest k 
number of instances (nearest neighbors) to that point are analyzed and the most 
common class of those are the prediction or classification of the new data point. 
Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI): A technique in Natural Language Processing (NLP) 
analyzing relationships between documents and the strings they contain. 
Layer: A collection of related neurons in a neural network such as the input layer or 




Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO): A regression technique 
that performs L1 regularization, meaning it penalizes the L1 norm of the feature 
weights which ultimately will force some of the weights to zero.   
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP): An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) that has an input 
layer, an output layer, and one or more hidden layers between. 
Mutation: An operator in evolutionary computing, where during the crossover process 
some random mutation of the traits from the parents occurs in the child, 
mimicking what happens in human reproduction. 
Natural Language Processing (NLP): Machine learning algorithms designed to 
understand human language. 
Nearfield Communication (NFC): A set of networking standards used to establish 
communication between mobile devices in very close proximity. 
Partial Decision Trees (PART): A Decision Tree that contains branches to undefined 
sub trees. 
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO): A population-based stochastic optimization 
technique inspired by intelligent collective behavior of animals such as flocks of 
birds or schools of fish. 
Precision: The proportion of positive predictions from a machine learning model that 
were actually correct. 
Preprocessing: The process that prepares a dataset to be ready as input for a machine 
learning model. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA): An unsupervised algorithm that creates linear 




subset, amounting to the most important, to be selected thereby reducing the 
number of features. 
Random Forest (RF): An ensemble technique for supervised learning classification that 
works by constructing a multitude of Decision Trees.  The final classification is 
the mode of the classes (classification) of the individual trees. 
Recall: Also known as True Positive Rate (TPR) is the proportion of actual positive 
outcomes that a machine learning model predicts correctly. 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE): An iterative procedure using backward feature 
elimination incorporating a classifier for ranking the features in each iteration. 
Receiver Operating Curve (ROC): A curve plotting Recall against False Positive Rate 
(FPR) for various thresholds. 
Regression: A machine learning model that predicts values along a continuous output 
variable. 
Selection: In evolutionary computing, the process that chooses fit individuals for creating 
the next generation through evolutionary operations such as crossover and 
mutation. 
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD): A matrix decomposition method used for feature 
dimensionality reduction. 
Support Vector Machine (SVM):  A linear method of classification in which data is 
defined as points in an n-dimensional space (where n is the number of features). 
The model defines a hyperplane that optimally separates (classifies) all of the data 




True Negative (TN): In the case of malware detection, an outcome where a benign app 
(negative) is correctly predicted as benign (negative). 
True Positive (TP): In the case of malware detection, an outcome where a malicious app 
(positive) is correctly predicted as malicious (positive). 
Virtual Machine (VM): A software emulation of a physical computer on an actual 
physical computer. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN): A networking technology that encrypts 
communication over an unsecured public network so that it can be used as if it 
were a secure private network. 
List of Acronyms 
ANN:  Artificial Neural Network 
API:  Application Programming Interface 
APK:  Android application package 
ART:  Android Runtime 
AUC:  Area Under the Curve 
CART:  Classification and Regression Tree 
CFG:  Control Flow Graph 
CFS:  Correlation-based Feature Selection 
CNN:  Convolutional Neural Network 




DNN:  Deep Neural Network 
DT:  Decision Tree 
ECM:  Evolving Clustering Method 
FCM:  Fuzzy C-means Method 
FN:  False Negative 
FP:  False Positive 
FPR:  False Positive Rate 
GA:  Genetic Algorithm 
GUI:  Graphical User Interface 
KNN:  K-nearest Neighbor 
LASSO:  Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator 
LSI:  Latent Semantic Indexing 
ML: Machine learning 
MLP:  Multilayer Perceptron 
NFC:  Nearfield Communication 
PART:  Partial Decision Trees 
PCA:  Principle Component Analysis 
PSO:  Particle Swarm Optimization 




RF:  Random Forest 
RFE:  Recursive Feature Elimination 
ROC:  Receiver Operating Curve 
OS:  Operating System 
SVD:  Singular Value Decomposition 
SVM:  Support Vector Machine 
TB:  Terabyte 
TN:  True Negative 
TP:  True Positive 
TPR:  True Positive Rate 
UI:  User Interface 
VM:  Virtual Machine 
VPN:  Virtual Private Network 
Summary 
As smartphones become more and more integral to peoples’ daily lives, both 
personal and business, the need to secure those systems grows.  With 85% of the worlds’ 
mobile phones running Google’s Android operating system, that OS has become the key 
threat vector for bad actors trying to compromise those systems.  There is a rich history 
of research in threat detection on computers dating back into the 1970s, but smartphones 




there has only been a decade of research on Android protection.  In addition to the 
relative newness of Android, Google continues to modify it, ostensibly for improvements 
in user experience and security, and threat actors continue to improve their methods of 
defeating its security.  It is an arms race. 
The ultimate goal in threat detection is identifying and stopping zero-day attacks.  
There are a number of research streams towards that end in the Android community, and 
one such approach is using static analysis and machine learning.  The concept is to 
analyze the source code of an Android app and using some machine learning algorithm, 
make the prediction as to if that app is benign or malicious.  Those predictions need to be 
highly accurate, not giving off too many false alarms; otherwise in a real-life situation it 
would tend to get ignored by the user. 
A key aspect of any machine learning model is the input data, or features.  In the 
decade of work in Android security, many different feature types and specific features 
have been used by researchers, and the variation in feature use continues today.  The 
most used feature types are components of the OS known as Permissions, Intents, and 
API calls, used individually or in various combinations.  But those are feature types.  
There are actually 158 different Permissions, 295 different Intents and several hundred 
API calls depending on how they are grouped. 
This study focuses on providing insight into feature importance for those three 
feature types and hundreds of specific features.  It was accomplished by testing all 
combinations of Permissions, Intents and API calls, using various feature ranking and 
subset selection techniques to determine the most important ones, and then validating 





Review of the Literature 
Android as a Target 
Android first appeared on the market in September 2008.  Early on there was little 
interest from threat actors due to the minimal volume of targets.  The first reported 
malware came two years later in August 2010 when Kaspersky Labs reported the 
discovery of the first SMS Trojan for Android, called “FakePlayer”  and Symantec 
reported finding location spyware consisting of a modified version of the classic “snake” 
video game. (Castillo, 2011)  
Even though the first threats in the wild were not detected until the third quarter 
of 2010, security researchers started investigating Android as soon as it was released.  In 
one early work Enck, et al. (2010)  reported on a dynamic analysis tool they created 
called TaintDroid.  It used a variation of information flow analysis called taint analysis 
where “tainted data” is injected into specified data flows in the running app, such as GPS 
location and contacts, then traced and analyzed it to determine if the app exposed private 
user information.  
Burguera, Zurutuza, and Nadjm-Tehrani (2011) reported on their crowd-source-
based malware detection app and system named Crowdroid.  This was an app that users 
ran on their phone and fed non-personal but app behavior data (system calls) over the 
Internet to central servers.  The servers would perform the malware analysis using a K-
means clustering algorithm and report results back to the user(s).  While the authors did 




contribution was this early demonstration of using machine learning in Android threat 
detection. 
Zhao, Zhang, Ge and Yuan (2012) created another tool using dynamic analysis 
they referred to as RobotDroid which incorporated a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for 
detection using system calls as the feature vector.  There was limited testing performed 
but for those tests a detection rate of 90% to 93% was reported with a false positive rate 
of 3% to 5%.   
In an assessment approach by Sahs and Khan (2012), their goal was to determine 
the effectiveness of using control flow graphs (CFGs) and Permissions via static analysis 
based on a Support Vector Machine as the classifier.  The system was tested on a dataset 
of 2,272 apps of which 4% were malicious.  The authors’ determination was that 
Permissions and CFGs appeared to be a correct approach in terms of input features for 
the SVM, but that the CFGs needed to be more detailed in order to improve the systems’ 
accuracy. 
In one early use of a large dataset consisting of over 200,000 apps, Zhou, Wang, 
Zhou and Jiang (2012) created a dual detection engine where in one side, they defined 
known malware signatures based on Permissions, and in the other used dynamic analysis 
looking for behaviors they considered likely to be used by malware, such as downloading 
code from the Internet to run.  The accuracy based on testing was high but the percentage 
of malware in the dataset was very small, less than one percent, so the results are unclear. 
Wu, Mao, Wei, Lee and Wu (2012) developed a host-based tool they named 
Droidmat to perform static analysis using Permissions, Intents, API calls and component 




Expectation Maximization (EM) clustering for feature selection and then K-nearest-
neighbor for classification.  An accuracy of 98% was reported on a test database of just 
over 1,700 apps with 13% malware.   
Xu, Zhang and Zhu (2013) created an assessment tool they referred to as 
Permlyzer to be a general-purpose Permission analysis framework.  The system used 
dynamic analysis to create a map, or call stack, that provided fine-grained information on 
Permissions use at runtime.  Permlyzer would actually takes control of the app (requiring 
modification to the base Android operating system) and execute all possible code paths.  
Their statistical findings based on analyzing over 100K apps showed significant overlap 
between Permission requests from malicious apps versus many non-malicious apps that 
use common third-party libraries indicating that using Permission only as features for 
malware detection could be problematic. 
Peiravian and Zhu (2013) investigated the using Permissions and API calls for 
Android malware detection.  Of those features, the authors created custom selection lists 
for attribute input to the classifiers.  They used three different machine learning 
approaches using the Weka library suite (Weka 3: Data Mining Software in Java, 2018).  
The three classifiers were Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees and Bagging 
Predictor.  The dataset contained 2,510 apps of which about 50% were malicious.  
Comparing the three approaches across multiple scenarios, Bagging was the top 
performer followed by Support Vector Machines and then Decision Trees with accuracy 
averaging around 95%. 
In research similar to above described, Huang, Tsai and Hsu (2013) investigated 




The key differences were: 1) Huang, et al., only used Permissions (all Permissions) and 
did not include API calls, 2) a Support Vector Machine was one of the algorithms but the 
other techniques were Decision Trees, Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost, and 3) their dataset 
was much larger at over 100K apps.  The results showed an average accuracy of 81% 
with the top performer being the Support Vector Machine, followed by Naïve Bayes and 
AdaBoost.  While the authors indicated satisfaction with the accuracy, clearly their 
research indicated detection using only Permissions was not likely to be successful. 
Yerima, Sezer, McWilliams and Muttik (2013) created a tool to scan Android app 
stores such as Google Play to help expunge them of malware.  They used Permissions 
and API calls as the features, Information Gain for feature selection and a Bayesian 
classifier.  Experiments were run against a dataset of 2,000 apps with 50% malware using 
various sets of the features selected ranging from 5 – 20 attributes.  Their results were 
that with 15 – 20 of the selected features, a predictive capability at a 90% to 92% could 
be achieved. 
Aung and Zaw (2013) also used Information Gain theory for feature selection 
based on Permissions only.  The selected features were evaluated using K-means 
clustering for segmentation and classification used Decision Tree and Random Forests 
algorithms.  Testing was conducted on two datasets of 200 and 500 apps.  The top 
performer was Random Forests with accuracy just under 92%.  The lowest was one of the 
Decision Tree algorithms at 85% accuracy. 
Glodek and Harang (2013) used a novel approach of feature engineering when 
they created a system starting with Permissions, Intents, Broadcast Receivers and the 




frequency of these in a set of malware apps were determined and a set of rules were 
created based on combinations observed, and these rules then became the real feature 
vector.  These were applied to a Random Forest algorithm from the Scikit-learn library 
(scikit-learn - Machine Learning in Python, 2010) using a custom dataset of benign apps 
combined with an existing malware dataset from the Malware Genome Project of Zhou 
and Jiang (2012).   The results of the experiments were an average accuracy of 81%. 
A Maturing Research Stream 
In a well-known study by Arp, et al. (2014) they created a system they referred to 
as DREBIN.  It used a broad feature set consisting of Permissions, Intents, API calls, app 
components, hardware components and URLs providing a feature vector of 545,000 
attributes.  These were the input into a Support Vector Machine for classification.  A 
dataset was created of 129,013 apps that also incorporated the Malware Genome Project 
malware dataset, ending up with 4% malware content.  Their results showed an accuracy 
of 94%, which was high for the time.  Interestingly, DREBIN also output information 
related to the input features detailing why it classified a specific app as malicious or 
benign. 
In an approach reminiscent of Enck, et al. (2010), Arzt, et al. (2014) used taint 
analysis for classification, but in their research used static instead of dynamic analysis.  
The system builds a model based on control flow graphs extracted from an app and uses 
tainted variables inserted into the flow to follow throughout all possible flow paths.  
Custom rules then determine if data is being leaked, indicating malware.  The number of 
apps tested was small but they did compare results to two commercially available 




In an interesting study of Permission usage in Android apps, Moonsamy, Rong, 
and Liu (2014) looked at what they termed “required” Permissions versus “used” 
Permissions.  In every Android app there is an xml file named, AndroidManifest.xml, 
that contains information about what the package uses and specifically Permissions that 
are requested.   Often researchers just use this list of Permissions (defined as “required” 
in this work) because they are easily attainable.  However, app developers can use other 
Permissions that are not in the manifest file.  To extract these the byte code has to be 
decompiled and the source code parsed to find which Permissions were “used.”  
Moonsamy, et al., extracted both for a dataset that contained over 1,200 benign apps plus 
the malware apps from the Genome Project and performed a statistical analysis looking at 
required Permissions for benign apps, required Permissions for malicious apps, used 
Permissions for benign apps and used Permissions for malicious apps.  Their results 
indicated there was enough difference between required and used, that used Permissions 
should be considered in malware detection as opposed to only required ones. 
Chan and Song (2014) investigated the detection accuracy of using Permissions 
and API calls compared to using Permissions only.  Information Gain theory was used for 
feature subset selection.  The test dataset consisted of 800 apps with 21% malicious.  
They tested Permissions only versus Permissions and API calls using seven different 
machine learning algorithms from the Weka library: Naïve Bayes, Support Vector 
Machine, two Neural Nets (RBF and MLP), Liblinear, Decision Tree and Random Forest.  
The average accuracy for Permissions only was 88.8% versus 89.3% with API calls 
indicating no difference.  The highest performer was Random Forest at 92%.  




accuracy.  While the results indicated there was no reason to add API calls as a feature, 
this is inconsistent with other published research.  The small dataset and feature subset 
selection could have had adverse effects on the answers. 
Sharma and Dash (2014) investigated feature selection approaches using 
Permissions and API calls.  The two feature selection methods were Correlation-based 
Feature Selection (CFS) using Pearson’s correlation and Information Gain theory.  They 
started with 35 features (19 Permissions and 16 API calls) that were preselected as 
important.  Based on the feature ranking of the two algorithms, various numbers of the 
features, top 5, top 10, etc. up to the full 35, were fed into both a Naïve Bayes algorithm 
and a K-nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm using a dataset of 2,000 apps at 50% 
malware.  Overall, there was minimal difference in the results coming through CFS 
versus Information Gain.  Interestingly, smaller numbers of features improved Naïve 
Bayes while more features improved KNN, and in general KNN performed better with up 
to 96% accuracy versus 94% with Naïve Bayes. 
Another feature selection investigation was performed by Zhao, Fang and Wang 
(2014) in which using only Permissions as the feature, they incorporated Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) for dimensionality reduction.  Initially, variations in PCA 
settings were used with a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to determine the optimum 
PCA configuration, which in their case resulted in a reduction down to 41 attributes.  
These features were then used with the a dataset of 454 apps of which 220 were malware 
for validation with seven machine learning algorithms: Bayesian Networks, Naïve Bayes, 
NB Tree, CART (Classification and Regression Tree), Random Tree, Decision Tree and 




below 87%, however, this result could be because the PCA parameters were tuned using 
the SVM.  No other combinations were reported. 
Seo, Gupta, Sallam, Bertino and Yim (2014) created a static analysis tool that 
looked at “suspicious” Permissions and API calls and performed keyword searches of the 
source code looking for strings that the authors identified as often being used in malware.  
The Permissions, API calls and keyword lists were developed based on a statistical 
analysis of the Malware Genome Project dataset.  The tool would then compare what it 
found in the app source code to the lists and provide a risk ranking.  Testing was 
performed on 76 apps that were selected because they fit the model, but accuracy results 
were not reported. 
In a similar vein, in research by Kang, Jang, Mohaisen and Kim (2015), they 
identified certain malicious behaviors like command usage with root privilege, hiding 
SMS notification, and collecting sensitive information as possibly indicating malware.  
Their system collected data from app source code as to if the app contained any of those 
behaviors.  In the next level their system looked for a usage of what they defined as 
“critical” Permissions.  These features were fed into a Naïve Bayes classifier and tested 
on a dataset of over 55,000 apps with 8% malware.  The accuracy was reported at 98% 
but given the hand-tooled nature of the features it is uncertain how generalizable this 
technique might be. 
Sun, Li, Yan, Srisa-an, and Pan (2016) created a three tiered feature selection 
method for reducing the dimensionality of a Permissions feature vector.  In the first level 
they used a forward selection custom ranking system to create the first feature subset.  




subset.  In the final tier they removed highly correlated features, ending up at a final 
subset of just 22 Permissions out of the starting 135 Permissions.  Validation used a 
dataset of approximately 5,500 apps with 18% malware and six different machine 
learning algorithms from the Weka library: Random Committee, Rotation Forest, 
Functional Tree, Decision Tree (PART), Random Forest and SVM.  The top performer 
was Functional Tree with 96% accuracy. 
Two methods of feature selection were investigated by Qiao, Sung and Liu (2016) 
as means of reducing dimensionality across the set of all Permissions and API calls.  The 
first was a filter method, ANOVA, and the second was a wrapper method, Recursive 
Feature Elimination (RFE) using an SVM.  Validation was performed using three 
machine learning algorithms: Random Forest, Artificial Neural Network and Support 
Vector Machine on a dataset of 5,000 custom collected benign apps and malware from 
the Genome Project.  Experiments were run with all features versus the selected features, 
and then with only Permissions, only API calls, and with both.  The results showed that 
using API calls or API calls and Permissions performed a little better than just 
Permissions (95% vs 93% on Random Forest).  The results also showed there was no 
appreciable difference between the two feature selection methods or in using all features 
versus incorporating feature selection.  The biggest factor in difference in accuracy was 
which machine learning algorithm was used with Random Forest and Neural Net 
performing about the same with 94% accuracy and SVM coming in at 82%. 
Another investigation of Permissions requested versus Permissions used was 
undertaken by Wang, Wang and Zhu (2016) but also included API calls.  Feature 




Feature Selection using Pearson’s correlation (CFS).  A number of combinations were 
run with each feature selection technique including just with used Permissions, just with 
requested Permissions, only API calls and then used Permissions with API calls.  The 
dataset involved had 2,375 apps with 50% malware.  Five machine learning algorithms 
from the Weka suite were used for validation: Decision Tree, Random Forest, K-nearest-
neighbor, Support Vector Machine and AdaBoost.  Results showed minimal difference in 
accuracy from feature selection using Information Gain versus  CFS, except when using 
only API calls in which case Information Gain in general was about 2% better.  Across 
the full test matrix, the top performer was AdaBoost with a reported accuracy of 99.8%, 
which seems high compared to other published results using the same features. 
Verma and Muttoo (2016) used Intents in addition to Permissions in their 
detection scheme incorporating Information Gain for feature selection.  Interestingly, the 
methodology treated the two features vectors separately, analyzing each app using Intents 
and then using Permissions.  Apps were labeled as malicious or benign if both processes 
agreed, otherwise it was labeled “suspicious.”  A dataset of 1,470 apps of with 42% 
malware was used with three classifiers from the Weka library: K-means clustering and 
two different Decision Trees, ID3 and J48.  Results showed that J48 performed best with 
an accuracy of 94% compared to 92% for ID3 and 74% for the K-means algorithm. 
Using a dynamic analysis approach, Yang, Wang, Ling, Liu and Ni (2017) built a 
customized version of Android as a "behavior inspection platform.”  It ran a taint tracking 
program on apps recording their API calls and Permissions use.  Experiments were run 
against a dataset of 3,934 apps with 27% malware.  Two classifiers were employed: a 




accuracy 98% versus 97% for Naïve Bayes, but false negative rate for Naïve Bayes was 
very high at 44%. 
In an interesting use of dynamic analysis, Mahindru and Singh (2017) ran apps 
through an emulator to extract Permissions used, which were then vectorized for use by 
static analysis.  They used a dataset of 11,000 apps with five different classifiers from the 
Weka suite: Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Simple Logistic and Lazy 
Instance-based learner (K*).  Reported results show an accuracy of 99% for Decision 
Tree, Random Forest and Simple Logistic which seems to be an outlier for using only 
Permissions as a feature set. 
In a novel approach to Permissions analysis for malware detection Shahriar, Islam 
and Clincy (2017) investigated using natural language processing, specifically Latent 
Semantic Indexing (LSI) to map the association of related Permissions to malicious apps 
based on the text in the Permission name or description.  The map was created using a 
custom malware dataset in one dimension and Dangerous Permissions in the other 
dimension.  Dimensionality reduction is then accomplished using Singular Value 
Decomposition (SVD).  Results from various tests showed successful identification of 
malware ranging from 76% to 89% but there could be an overfitting problem given the 
overlap of training and test apps. 
Nezhadkamali, Soltani and Seno (2017) reported on their research using 
Permissions, Intents and API calls that also used a concept they referred to as Feature 
Pockets, when two or more features from the three separate feature sets overlap with each 
other, i.e., have the same resource.  A feature refinement process was performed to 




selection methods, tested separately: Information Gain, Gini Impurity and LASSO (L1).  
The dataset used consisted of the 1,260 malicious apps from the Genome Project plus an 
additional 498 benign apps.  Classification was performed with three machine learning 
algorithms: Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine and Random Forest.  The test matrix 
included all combinations of feature selection methods and classification methods plus 
using Permissions only, Permissions and API calls, and Permissions, API calls and 
Intents.  The results showed that using all three features, Permissions, API calls and 
Intents was more accurate than using just Permissions or Permissions and API calls.  In 
terms of feature selection methods, Information Gain proved more accurate across all 
classifiers, and lastly, Random Forest, was the highest performing classifier with 99% 
accuracy.  As with the prior study by Shahriar, et al., the small size of the dataset makes 
the relevance of the high accuracy results somewhat suspect. 
Research performed by Altaher (2017) used just Permissions as the feature input 
with feature selection based on Information Gain theory.  For classification, a neuro-
fuzzy system was created by modifying an evolving cluster method (ECM) system for 
generating the fuzzy rules, which then feed into a neural network.  A dataset of 500 apps 
were used, half being malware.  Results showed an accuracy of 90% which is comparable 
to other works using Permissions only.  Follow-up work was performed by Altaher and 
BaRukab (2017) again using Permissions and Information Gain for feature selection.  
Instead of using ECM to generate the fuzzy rules, they used a Fuzzy c-means (FCM) 
clustering algorithm.  The testing dataset consisted of the 1,260 apps of the Malware 





Wang, Li, Wang, Liu and Zhang (2018) used a set of features for their study that 
included Permissions, Intents, API calls and hardware used.  A feature selection wrapper 
method based on a Support Vector Machine (SVM) was used for dimensionality 
reduction.  A dataset of over 116,000 apps with 7% malware was used for testing.  Five 
different machine learning algorithms were used in addition to an ensemble method.  The 
five were: SVM, Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, K-nearest Neighbor (KNN) and 
Classification and Regression Tree (CART).  The ensemble approach was a simple 
voting scheme among the five.  Interestingly the accuracy of all but Naïve Bayes was 
98% to 99%, and it was significantly lower with 76% accuracy. 
Shang, Li, Deng and He (2018) used a two-phase feature selection approach in 
their Permissions only research.  The first step was to use Pearson’s correlation and 
create the first feature subset by eliminating Permissions below a specified p-value.  In 
the second phase Information Gain theory is used to create a second subset and provide 
weighting input for the Naïve Bayes classifier used.  Tests were run on a dataset of 2,670 
apps with 65% malware.  Results showed the Naïve Bayes accuracy at 86% which is on 
par for Permissions only detection methods.  
In research by Alswaina and Elleithy (2018), Permissions were the sole feature 
vector under consideration.  Feature selection was performed by a wrapper method using 
Extremely Randomized Trees for creating a feature subset.  The dataset used was that of 
the Malware Genome Project which was tested using five machine learning classifiers 
plus one ensemble method: Support Vector Machine, Neural Network, Decision Tree, K-
nearest-neighbor (KNN) and Random Forest.  The ensemble method was Bagging with 




(itself an ensemble method) and Neural Network at 96% accuracy followed closely by 
KNN at 95%.  The numbers appear a bit high for Permissions only, which possibly points 
back to the small size of the dataset. 
Firdaus, Anuar, Karim and Ab (2018) used directories accessed, and system 
commands in addition to Permissions and API calls as their features.  Next they used a 
wrapper method for feature selection incorporating a Genetic Algorithm from the Weka 
library.  Interestingly, the resulting feature set consisted of only six attributes: three 
Permissions, two services and one directory, but no system commands.  The dataset used 
consisted of 6,105 apps of which 5,555 were malicious.  Validation was performed with 
five classifiers: Naïve Bayes, Neural Net, Functional Tree, Random Forest and Decision 
Tree.  Testing showed an accuracy of roughly 95% for all five classifiers.  This odd result 
may indicate the GA culled the feature set too far, not providing a broad enough feature 
vector. 
In an interesting study of feature selection techniques for Permissions-based 
malware detection, Bhattacharya, Goswami and Mukherjee (2019) proposed Particle 
Swarm Optimization (PSO) using rough set theory and compared results against nine 
other feature selection techniques, including six filter methods and three wrapper 
methods.  The filter methods were: Pearson correlation, Information Gain, Gain Ratio, 
Chi-squared, One Rule and Relief.  The wrapper methods were: Forward Selection, PSO 
(not incorporating rough set theory) and Genetic Algorithm. Testing was done with two 
different datasets and a Decision Tree classifier.  Their proposed PSO method improved 




The results also showed all the filter methods being better than any of the wrapper 
methods.    
A Static Analysis Survey 
Android security and privacy research has grown tremendously during its ten 
years of existence.  Acar, et al. (2016)  surveyed the state of research and categorized it 
into five major categories: 1) Permission-based access control, 2) app webification issues 
(the integration of web content into mobile apps), 3) programmer-induced leakage, i.e., 
poor programming practices, 4) software distribution channels (trust worthiness of app 
markets), and 5) vendor customization leading to OS fragmentation.  Of the publications 
cited, over 50% were in the Permission-based access control grouping. 
A more recent survey by Talal, et al. (2019) took a different approach in research 
categorization.  They presented four broad categories: 1) survey and review, 2) security 
solutions, subdivided into malware protection techniques and malware detection 
techniques, 3) malware studies, ranging from data collections to social science models, 
and 4) ranking and classification, i.e., classifying malware according to their families or 
security risk level.  The majority of research reported on was in the second grouping, 
security solutions.  Of those, approximately 75% were focused on detection versus 25% 
on protection. 
Tam, Feizollah, Anuar, Salleh and Cavallaro (2017) describe malware detection 
techniques as falling into one of three categories: 1) static analysis which evaluates an 
app without executing any code, 2) dynamic analysis which executes the app and 
observes the results, and 3) hybrid analysis which combines techniques of static and 




remaining split between dynamic and hybrid analysis.  These numbers align with another 
review by Sufatrio, Tan, Chua and Thing (2015) in which the publications they cited 
represented 63% static analysis with again, the remaining split evenly between dynamic 
and hybrid analysis. 
A significant amount of static analysis research uses machine learning (ML).  In 
their survey, Talal, et al. (2019), describe fifteen different ML techniques in use among 
the work cited.  Approximately two-thirds make use of multiple techniques with the rest 
using a single ML technique.  The most common ones in use, and all about the same level 
were, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest and Support Vector Machine. 
Table 4 presents the results of a survey conducted by this author cataloging 71 
publications in which machine learning techniques were used for Android malware 





















































In the collection of research, there were 31 different machine learning techniques 
used across all of the works, shown along the top row of the table.  The columns 
representing which technique each effort used are ordered by most used on the left with 
lesser used techniques going to the right.   
Survey Analysis 
A metadata analysis is presented in Table 5.  In this cataloging, the five most used 
techniques were Support Vector Machine first at 31% of the publications incorporating it, 
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second was Random Forest, followed by Neural Networks, Decision Tree and Naïve 
Bayes.  Each of the other techniques are below 10% going from a count of five down to 
one.  The most techniques evaluated by a single source was seven while 34 publications, 
almost half, cited using a single technique. 
In the community of Android malware detection research there are two datasets 
that are often cited and or used either in whole or in part.  Those datasets are the Android 
Malware Genome Project (Zhou & Jiang, 2012) which contain 1,260 malware samples, 
and the Drebin dataset (Arp, et al., 2014) which contains 129,013 total samples of which 
5,560 are malware and the rest benign.  Interestingly, the 5,560 malware samples in 
Drebin include the 1,260 samples from the Genome Project.  For creating custom 
datasets, there are various places to get benign apps, the main one being Google Play; 
however, the availability of verified malware samples is much more limited, and rightly 
so.  Two major sources of malware samples are VirusShare (VirusShare, 2020) and 
Contagio Malware Dump (Contagio Malware Dump, 2020). 
Of the work presented above, only three confined themselves to solely using one 
of these two referenced datasets.  All others create a custom dataset but often using 
samples from one or both of the two referenced datasets.   Of the 71 citations, 51 
provided information on the source of their dataset’s malware samples.  Table 6 is a 
metadata analysis of those sources.   Given that the Drebin dataset includes the Genome 
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Project samples, those two represent 66% of the source with VirusShare and Contagio 
providing the rest at 14% and 20% respectively. 
Also of interest is dataset size.  In machine learning, more data for testing and 
training is always better, but assembling a custom dataset can require a lot of work.  So it 
is not surprising to see a wide range of dataset sizes, i.e., the number of APK files used, 
within the referenced work.  The range goes from a low of 106 samples up to a maximum 
of 206,264 samples.  As shown in the metadata analysis in Table 7 around 65% of the 
research was conducted with datasets of 10,000 or less and only 15% used 100,000 or 
more.  
A final point of interest related to the datasets used is the percentage of APKs in 
the dataset that is malware.  Table 8 presents a metadata analysis of that metric.   Note 
that there are two modalities in evidence: 20% and below being the first and 41 – 60 % 
being the second.  None of the work reported testing with various percentages of malware 
using the same dataset, so the impact of this distribution is to be determined. 
Table 7  
Dataset Sizes 
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Compared to the computer industry overall, mobile operating systems are a 
relatively new component of the technology landscape.  The convergence to only two 
major players, Android and iOS, is just over a decade old.  New operating systems are 
always followed by new threat vectors and Android was no different.  With just over ten 
years of research in Android malware detection, there has been significant progress, but 
there remain gaps that need to be addressed. 
One major void is an exhaustive analysis of what Android features are most 
indicative for malware detection.  While there has been significant work in the industry 
on feature selection for machine learning in general, there is a definite lack of such a 
focus with respect to Android, with ample evidence shown in the above survey. 









Table 9 lists the notations to be used for the remainder of this text.  The format 
uses bold uppercase characters for matrices (e.g. X), bold lowercase characters for 
vectors (e.g., y) and italicized, uppercase fonts for sets (e.g. F  ).   
The first step in designing the experiments is to select the library to be employed.   
Table 9   
Symbols 
This notation closely follows that used by Li, et al., (2017). 
Notations Description 
E Expected values 
O Observed values 
n Number of instances in the dataset 
d Number of all features in the dataset 
k Number of selected features 
X Binary data matrix with n instance and d or k features 
x i j Feature values for i
th instance and jth feature 
Y Binary class label vector for all n instances 
y i Class value for i
th instance 
W Feature weight vector for k features 
w j Feature weight value for j
th feature 
F Original feature set with d features 
S Selected feature set with k selected features 
V Contrast variables matrix, n instances with 3 features  




Scikit-Learn (scikit-learn - Machine Learning in Python, 2010) was selected as the library 
to use due to it being open source, written in Python and having a broad list of available 
algorithms. 
Feature Scope 
The breadth of feature types used in static analysis for Android malware detection 
is presented in Table 3.  For this research, the feature types under test were the top three 
of interest in the community: Permissions, API calls and Intents.  The next two in the list, 
hardware and app components, are essentially redundant to the first three since to use 
either, an API call is required and possibly even a Permission.  The remaining features, 
such as CFGs, URLs, etc., may be important in some domains but are believed to be less 
important in this research given that every Android app, malware and benign, will make 
use of a variety of Permissions, API calls and Intents providing a broad detection surface.  
Adding other feature sets is unlikely to increase that detection surface area enough to 
justify the increase in computational time and therefore in detection time.  
Given the diversity of the combinations of the three in use, all seven combinations 
are used as starting feature sets in the experiment as shown in Figure 2.  This includes 
using the three individually as well as all together as a single feature set in addition to the 
other various combinations.  Each combination occurs prior to any subset selection.  
Given that there are 158 Permissions, 295 Intents and 581 significant API calls, the 
starting feature sets range from as low as 158 attributes (Permissions only) to 1,034 




Feature Selection Algorithms 
 As described in the section Feature Selection, there are three main objective 
approaches to feature selection: 
1. Filter methods 
2. Wrapper methods 
3. Embedded methods 
Given that the focus of this research work is to provide an expansive view of 
feature importance, multiple feature selection techniques were used from each of the 
above categories in order to compare and contrast the selected features with 
representative approaches across the spectrum.  Table 10 lists the eleven selected 
techniques: three univariate filter methods, three multivariate, three wrapper methods and 
two embedded methods.  Univariate filter methods assume independence of the features 
from one another and only select based on the correlation with the class.  These three 
univariate algorithms were selected due to the popularity of those methods in feature 
Table 10  





selection and therefore it would be informative to see the results they produce compared 
directly.   
Univariate Filter Methods 
Chi-Square 
The Chi-Square test is used in statistics to test the independence of two events, or 
in the case of feature selection to test whether the occurrence of a specific feature value 
and the occurrence of a specific class are independent.  It can be expressed as: 
𝜒2(𝑿| 𝒚) =   ∑ ∑







                                             (1) 
where r is the number of different values in a given feature vector, d is the number of 
features in the dataset, O is the count of observed values and E is the expected frequency  
(Li, et al., 2017). 
Information Gain 
Information Gain (also known as Mutual Information) is a statistical method that 
measures the amount of information shared between a feature and its class labels.  It is 
based on the concept of information entropy from information theory.  Information Gain 
is defined as:  





 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋
                                (2) 
where P(xi) is the probability of xi over X, P(yi) is the probability of yi over Y, and P(xi, yi) 





The Relief algorithm (Kononenko, 1994) estimates the quality of attributes 
according to how well their values distinguish between instances that are near to one 
another.  Given a randomly selected instance vector xi, it searches for the two nearest 
neighbors: one from the same class, and the other from a different class, and then updates 
the quality estimate for all the features, depending on the values for xi. 
Relief can be expressed as: 
𝑅(𝑿|𝒚) =  
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖′ ×  ∑ 𝑃(𝑥)2𝑥∈𝑋
(1 −  ∑ 𝑃(𝑌)2𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌 ) ∑ 𝑃(𝑌)
2
𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌
                                     (3) 
where Gini′ is a modified version of the Gini-index which is highly correlated with 
Information Gain covered earlier, P(x) is the probability of the values of vector x, and 
P(y) is the probability of the classes in the labeled set. 
Multivariate Filter Methods 
Multivariate methods select feature importance based on higher correlation with 
the class, just like univariate methods, but then look for low correlation between features.  
CFS (Correlation-based Feature Selection) will be used to take the same three sets of 
correlations and consider the interaction among features 
Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) 
Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) is based on the thesis that “A good 
feature subset is one that contains features highly correlated with (predictive of) the class, 
yet uncorrelated with (not predictive of) each other” (Hall, 1999).  It requires an initial 
correlation analysis on which to base the selection algorithm.  While this initial technique 




previously discussed univariate methods were used: Chi-Square, Information Gain and 
Relief. 
CFS uses a concept of “Merit” as a heuristic by which to compare inter-feature 
correlation.  It is given by: 
𝑀𝑆  =  
𝑘 𝑟𝑐𝑓̅̅ ̅̅
√𝑘 +  𝑘(𝑘 −  1) 𝑟𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅
                                                     (4) 
where S is the feature subset with k number of selected features, 𝑟𝑐𝑓̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean feature-
class correlation and 𝑟𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean feature-feature correlation (Hall, 1999). 
Wrapper Methods 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) is an iterative procedure using backward 
feature elimination.  However, as opposed to eliminating just one feature at a time, it 
allows for evaluating and eliminating (or keeping) feature subsets (Guyon, Weston, 
Barnhill, & Vapnik, 2002).  RFE incorporates a classifier for ranking the features in each 
iteration.  RFE can be described by: 
      (5) 
 
where F d is the original feature set with d features, S k is a selected feature set with k 
selected features and n is the subset reduction value.  Guyon and collaborators originally 
developed RFE using an SVM as the classifier, but it has since been used with different 
models among researchers, most notably Random Forest, as exemplified by Ustebay, 







Ridge regression, also known as Tikhonov regularization, is a multiple regression 
technique using a cost function based on the residual sum of squares.  It adds a 
regularization (or penalty) function that is an L2 norm, i.e., based on Euclidean distance.  
Optimization is based on minimizing the cost function, which is defined as: 











                                       (6) 
        ├─    regression model    ─┤ ├─ penalty function ─┤ 
where y is a vector of the class observations for n number of instances in the dataset, x is 
a matrix of the model predictor variables for n instances by d number of features, and w is 
the vector of weights (or model coefficients) corresponding to each feature.  
To control the regularization function, λ is used as a tuning parameter that 
increases or decreases the size of the penalty, which for Ridge, is the sum of the squares 
of the weight coefficients.  This implies that for λ = 0 the coefficients are the same as 
simple linear regression and as λ → ∞ all coefficients are driven towards zero, but never 
actually reach zero (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017). 
LASSO regression 
LASSO, which stands for Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator, was 
developed to improve on Ridge regression by performing L1 regularization using 
Manhattan distance instead of using L2.  The cost function is similar to Ridge except for 
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                                       (7) 
        ├─    regression model    ─┤ ├─ penalty function ─┤ 
where y is a vector of the class observations for n number of instances in the dataset, x is 
a matrix of the model predictor variables for n instances by d number of features, and w is 
the vector of weights (or model coefficients) corresponding to each feature.    
As with Ridge, λ is a tuning parameter that controls the size of the penalty, but for 
LASSO, the penalty is the sum of the absolute value of the weight coefficients.  This 
implies that for λ = 0 the coefficients are the same as simple linear regression and as λ → 
∞ all coefficients approach zero and some actually equal zero implicitly selecting features 
to be eliminated, which is the desired improvement of LASSO over Ridge   
(Tibshirani, 1996).   
Machine Learning Algorithm Selection 
The goal of this research was to show the variation in feature selection inputs and 
indicate how that variation reflects in different machine learning models.  It was not a 
goal to find a best performing feature set, nor to find a best performing machine learning 
model.  
The classifier selection was based on common usage among other researchers so 
as to make replication and comparison easy.  In the same vein, with the exception of 
Random Forest, ensemble techniques were eliminated, such as boosting and stacking.  
The final consideration was performance.  It was desired to have models that have 




Based on the data presented earlier in Tables 1, 2 and 5, the three classifiers 
selected were Random Forest, Support Vector Machine and Neural Network.  
Specifically, the Neural Network classifier was a Perceptron, chosen because the problem 
at hand is one of binary classification and with a single layer would be expected to have 
high performance in terms of speed to convergence.  The list of selected algorithms is 
presented in Table 11.   
Experiment Design 
Preprocessing 
A high-level view of the preprocessing procedure is presented in Figure 3.  The 
malware dataset used is a custom collection of over 119,000 Android apps with an eight 
percent malware component.  See the section Datasets for more details. 
There are many tools available for reverse engineering Android apps.  Four 
requirements were identified for tool selection for this project.  First, it needs to be open 
source in order to provide a level of transparency as well as be affordable.  Second, the 
open source project needs to be actively maintained.  Given that Android itself changes 
from time to time and is customized by different vendors, it is critical to use a tool that 
stays up to date with those changes.  Third, the tool needs to have a command line 
interface to support automation.  A good test database of APKs consists of thousands of 
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files, too many to use a GUI one file at a time.  And finally, the decompiled files need to 
be in Java simply due to the author's expertise in that language versus Android assembly 
language.  
Jadx (Dex to Java decompiler, 2019) was selected.  It meets all the stated 
requirements and is a popular tool among Android researchers.  Firdaus, Anuar, Karim 
and Ab (2018) used Jadx in their research on Android feature selection.  Pauck, Bodden 
and Wehrheim (2018) presented a new approach for comparing taint analysis tools and 
used Jadx to prep the data.  It was also used as part of the development of a new classifier 
approach to get around obfuscation by Martin, Menendez and Camacho (2017).  And 
Chen, Fan, Chen, Su, Li, Liu and Xu (2019) actually incorporated Jadx as part of their 
Storydroid tool for use in app development. 






Jadx has a graphical user interface as well as a command line interface, the latter 
making it convenient for integrating with other tools.  Its main function is decompressing 
APK’s resulting in .xml files and .dex files.  It then decompiles the .dex files into Java 
source code. 
From the resulting .xml and .java source files, the features of interest are then 
parsed using custom Python code.  For this experiment, those features are Permissions, 
Intents and API Calls.  To simplify data management each feature is assigned a unique 
identifier consisting of the first letter of the type, P for Permissions, I for Intents and A 
for API Calls, followed by the concatenation of an integer value ranging from 1 to the 
maximum number of features available.  As an example, Permission IDs went from P001 
to P158 and the Permission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE was assigned an ID of 
P100.   
A separate module of the code then performs binary encoding of the extracted 
features to account for the existence (1) or non-existence (0) of each feature in each APK 
file, an example of which is depicted in Figure 4 as a dataset fragment of the Permissions 
file.  The encoding creates three datasets, one for each feature type as well as a dataset 
containing just the target variable indicating malware (1) or benign (0).  Keeping each of 
the four datasets in separate files makes the mechanics of concatenating them for the test 
dataset of interest a simple exercise.  Each of these four files contains 119,183 rows of 




These feature vector datasets segmented as Permissions, Intents and API Calls can 
then be used individually or combined into larger feature vectors by concatenating the 
segments.  Table 12 shows the seven combinations of the three feature types and 
associated feature counts possible for each combination. 
Feature Subset Selection 
Feature subset selection is the process of selecting a subset of relevant features for 
use in model construction.  The goal is to remove features that are either redundant or 
Table 12  
Datasets Test Matrix 
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irrelevant.  For this experiment, there are four phases (as depicted in Figure 5) 
encompassed in an 8-step process (shown in Figure 6).  Phase 1 starts with all 
Permissions, Intents and API calls.  The next three phases, Algorithmic Selection, 
Performance Selection and K-based Selection are descibed in the following sections. 
Algorithmic Selection 
Algorithmic selection refers to the feature selection method actually eliminating 
non-relevant features as part of its process.  Of the eleven feature selection algorithms 
used, eight perform this type of subset selection.  The three that do not are Information 
Gain, Chi-squared and Ridge Regression.  For example, if 100 features are submitted to 
the Information Gain algorithm, it will return the weights for all 100 features.  However 
if 100 features are submitted to the LASSO Regression algorithm, it will return weights 
only for the features the algorithm deems significant, so that would be some number less 
than 100 most likely.  In other words, in this case, LASSO Regression has 
algorithmically selected a subset of features. 
Figure 5   





In many library implementations the operator can specify the number of features 
to return, so in this example, one could submit 100 features to Information Gain and 
request some arbitrary number of features in return, say the top 10.  In that case, the 
algorithm would return only the top 10 weights, but that is arbitrary subset selection 
based on the operator’s experience, domain knowledge or simple guess, but having 
nothing to do with the calculations of the algorithm.  
Figure 6  





Algorithmic selection steps are 3 - 7 in Figure 6.  They include randomizing the 
rows of the dataset, then dividing it into k-fold datasets, specifically five, resulting in five 
datasets of approximately 24k rows, and each is then submitted to one of the eleven 
feature selection algorithms.  The five results are then aggregated and the mean is 
calculated.  These results are then normalized so that all weights are in the range of zero 
to one. 
Figure 7 is an example using dummy data of what a resulting subset of 25 
features, P01 – P25, might look like, with each feature having a weight assigned by the 
feature selection algorithm.   
At this point in the process there are two distinct types of results, one where all 
features fed into the feature selection algorithm are returned with weights, and a second 
where the only features and weights returned are those deemed significant by the 
selection algorithm.  These two cohorts will be referred to as C1 and C2 respectively. 
For C1, no features have been eliminated.  Put conversely, no features have been 
selected.  A process is needed to select the significant features.  For the C2 cohort, there 
are feature subsets as selected by the respective algorithms, but there has been no process 
to evaluate the quality of those subsets.  The performance selection process is used to 
address these two issues. 
Figure 7  






Performance selection refers to analyzing the performance of the feature selection 
algorithm and further subsetting by elimination of features deemed irrelevant based on an 
independent measure of the feature selection algorithm’s output.  From the weights 
assigned by algorithmic selection, rank order of importance can be determined, however, 
from this ranking of features, it is not evident how to threshold the ranking to incorporate 
only important attributes and to exclude others as noise.  As an example, assume a feature 
selection algorithm returns a subset of 400 features, each having an associated real 
number weight.  One could consider the attribute with the highest weight value as the 
most important feature and the attribute with the smallest weight value as the least 
important feature, but how does one determine if all 400 features are relevant?  Rather, is 
it the top ranked 25, or 50, or 100 that are relevant? 
That is the question addressed by Tuv, Borisov and Torkkols (2006) when they 
introduced the use of “artificial contrast variables.”  To quote their introduction of the 
concept: 
In order to determine a cut-off point for the importance scores, there 
needs to be a contrast variable that is known to be truly independent of the 
target.  By comparing variable importance to this contrast (or several), 
one can then use a statistical test to determine which variables are truly 
important. 
In their experiments using contrast variables ensembled with a Random Forest classifier, 
Tuv, Borisov and Torkkols (2006) show that the technique outperformed RFE and CFS 




In a work on determining causality, Guyon, Janzing and Scholkopf (2010) refers 
to these contrast variables as “probes” similar to those used in statistics for ranking by 
comparing the index of ranked variables to the index of hypothetical variables from a null 
distribution set of irrelevant variables.  They further describe the use of probes as 
“…relatively straightforward for regular feature selection” and even reference their use in 
a previous work by Guyon, et al. (2008). 
Kursa and Rudnicki (2011) used a Random Forest classifier for setting feature 
importance in their gene expression dataset and contrast variables combined with a 
Borata algorithm for feature subset development.  Lin, et al. (2012) used contrast 
variables combined with RFE wrapping an SVM for feature selection in order to subset a 
high dimension database from chromatography–mass spectrometry systems.  In another 
medical application, Paja and Pancerz (2017) used Information Gain for weighting and 
then contrast variables for thresholding to develop their final feature subset. 
In using contrast variables, one has to consider the possible impact of the added 
columns on feature ranking and on performance.  This could range from zero (no contrast 
variables) to some number greater than the number of real features.  In terms of a 
percentage of the total number of real features, in practice researchers report successful 
results with ranges from 0.5% to 2.5%.  Considering an example dataset with 400 
features this would equate to adding from 2 to 10 artificial attributes. 
For this work, thresholding was also accomplished using artificial contrast 
variables.  They are treated as additional features, just as the Permissions, Intents and API 
Calls.  The major difference is that instead of consisting of data extracted from actual 




generation algorithm, in this case, 0 or 1 due to the binary nature of the datasets.   To the 
feature selection algorithm, these contrast features are just additional features, no 
different than the Permissions, Intents or API Calls, and the algorithm assigns weights to 
the contrast features just like all other real features. 
In that these experiments evaluate all features in each set and run time was not 
important, the number of contrast variables used was not significant.  The number 
ultimately selected and incorporated into each set was three.  Early prototypes were run 
with a single contrast variable and it was observed that some algorithms provided 
inconsistent results (weights) when repeated, so three were tested and using the average 
of the weights made the observed variation much smaller.  No runs were made with more 
than three since it was judged there would be diminishing return. 
The process then is to contrast the weights (or more precisely the mean of the 
weights) of these features of random  data to the weights of the features from algorithmic 
selection and determine if further feature reduction if indicated.  
For this step, let F represent the original matrix of feature vectors: 
F m = {Permissions, Intents … }  (see Table 12) 
where m = 7 (the number of instances).  
 𝑭 𝑉  =  𝑭 𝑚  +  𝑽 
where V is the matrix of contrast variables added to the original matrix of attributes for 
each dataset.  A matrix of candidate feature sets, F  T is created by applying each feature 
selection technique T where: 
 T r = {Chi-Square, Information Gain, … }  (See Table 10) 




 F  T = Tr (F  V ) 
The size n of each candidate feature set will vary based on the results of the selection 
algorithm.  For each feature set in F  T , the values of the weights vector, w, are 
determined by T  which equates to a feature importance measure.  Let 𝒘 𝐹 be the weights 
matrix for the orignial features F  m , and let 𝒘 𝑉 be the weights matrix for the contrast 
variable features V.  Then the preliminary subset S  ′ of signficant features is built from the 
features of F  whose weights are greater than the mean of the weights of the features of V 
( 𝒘𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ), such that:   
𝑺′ ⊆   𝑭 𝑚  
Getting back to the previous example, Figure 8 shows the weights of the contrast 
variables to the right of the weights of the original features, labeled as R01, R02 and R03, 
where the label ‘R’ stands for random.  They are separate in the figure to help visualize 
the process, but the feature selection algorithm just sees them as features no different than 
P01 - P25 and assigns weights similarly.  (See also step 2 in Figure 6.)  In this example, 
the mean of the weights of the contrast variables is 0.408.  The weight of each feature, 
P01 - P25, is then compared to that mean, and if the weight of that feature is less than 
0.408, it is eliminated.  In the figure this is represented in the second row which shows 9 
Figure 8  





of the 25 features removed.  Then, as shown on the third row of the figure, an importance 
order is inferred based on the weights, resulting in a feature significance order for this 
instance with the range 1 - 16. 
With respect to the C1 cohort where all features have a weight value, the 
population of S  ′ is trivial.  However, for C2, there are three variations possible.  The first 
is where none of the feature weights are greater than 𝒘 𝑉̅̅ ̅̅̅: 
𝒘 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝐹  ≤  𝒘 𝑉̅̅ ̅̅̅  
 meaning the algorithm that selected those features could not distinguish between real 
features that are truly significant and random data.  The second scenario is the opposite, 
where all of the feature weights from the algorithmic selection process are greater than 
𝒘 𝑉̅̅ ̅̅̅: 
𝒘 𝑚𝑖𝑛
 𝐹  >  𝒘 𝑉̅̅ ̅̅̅  
This result has the performance selection process in complete agreement as to the 
significance of all the features selected.  The third scenario is a mix of these two extremes 
where some of the feature weights are greater than 𝒘𝑉̅̅ ̅̅  and some are not: 
𝒘 𝑚𝑖𝑛
 𝐹  <  𝒘 𝑉̅̅ ̅̅̅  ≥  𝒘 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝐹    
  For comparing this effect, let the number of features returned from a given 
algorithmic selection process be 𝑛𝐴𝑆 and the number of features returned from the 
performance selection process as 𝑛𝑃𝑆, then we can define the effectiveness of that 
algorithm for feature selection as: 
eff𝑖  =  
𝑛𝑃𝑆
𝑛𝐴𝑆




where i is the feature selection method in Table 10.  In such a rating, 100% effectiveness 
would be the case in which performance selection was in full agreement with the 
algorithmic selection results and 0% effectiveness is the case where the feature selection 
algorithm could not distinguish between significant features and random data. 
Feature Ranking 
As described by Bolon-Canedo, Sanchez-Marono and Alonso-Betanzos (2013), 
there are two main approaches to evaluating feature selections, individual evaluation, 
which provides an ordered ranking of features, and subset evaluation, which provides a 
candidate feature subset.  In that the goal of this research was to analyze the importance 
of all Android features within the three categories of Permissions, Intents and API Calls, 
as opposed to selecting a single, best performing feature set, the individual evaluation 
approach was selected which provides an ordered ranking of features. 
In order to evaluate performance of specific features across a range of subset 
creation methods an ensemble voting scheme was chosen based on quartile membership 
of the ordered set and across two data stratifications: dataset combination and feature 
selection method.  There is a long history of quartile analysis as an evaluative technique 
going as far back as Tukey (1977) in his seminal work Exploratory Data Analysis 
although he used the term hinges.  As defined by Langford (2006), the simplest way to 
delineate a quartile is to find the median of a dataset, the number which puts at least half 
of the data values at that number or below and at least half of the data values at that 
number or above, and then to define the first quartile (Q1) to be the median of the bottom 
half, and the third quartile (Q3) to be the median of the top half.  Data below the Q1 point 




Quartiles are often used in statistical outlier identification (Rousseeuw & Hubert, 
2011) where the aim is to minimize the impact of outliers.  While that was not the goal 
desired here, the identification task is the same.  The approach is generic in that it spans 
many research streams.  As examples, Shih and Liu (2016) used quartile analysis for 
threshold determination in their work in image processing, and Lee and Sumiya (2010) 
employed it to geo-locate social event occurrence based on Twitter data. 
Final determination to use quartiles came after data statistics were computed 
using half deciles, deciles, the selected quartile, second quartile and percentiles.  The goal 
of the analysis is to provide a meaningful representation of importance.  It was 
determined based on the range of statistical calculations that half deciles and deciles 
filtered too much of the results.  Conversely, second quartile did not adequately bring 
higher performers to the top and percentiles simply did not provide a clear demarcation 
point.   
Cluster analysis was another alternative considered but rejected.  While it could 
show the groups, theoretically some being significant and others not, but there is no 
inherit ranking such as  
Q1 < Q2 < Q3 < Q4 
as naturally available in quartile analysis. 
Ranking by dataset combination 
Define 𝜌𝑑𝑖 to be the number of times the order of feature 𝒇𝑖 is in the first quartile 
for the d th  combination among the m dataset combinations used.  Then the range of 𝜌𝑑𝑖 
can be given as: 




where T  is the set of feature selection methods used with |T | = 11, and  
    1 ≤  𝑖 ≤  |F  |  
where F  are the original feature sets based on m combinations.  To be more concrete, if 
𝜌𝑑𝑖  = 11 then the i
th feature of F  was ranked in the top 25% by each feature selection 
method, i.e., it is selected as an important feature.  Conversely if 𝜌𝑑𝑖 = 0 then none of the 
feature selection methods ranked that feature as important.  (Note that F  does not contain 
the contrast variables as their usefulness was for performance selection and are not to be 
treated as real features for the ranking process.) 
For comparison of 𝜌𝑑𝑖 across the data stratifications, a permutation (reordering) of 
features can be defined by: 
〈 𝜋(𝑑1), 𝜋(𝑑2), . . . , 𝜋(𝑑, |𝐹|) 〉 
with 
𝜌𝜋(𝑑1)  ≥  𝜌𝜋(𝑑2)  ≥ . . . ≥  𝜌𝜋(𝑑,|𝐹|) 
so that sequences can be mapped. 
Ranking by feature selection method 
Define 𝜌𝜏𝑖 to be the number of times the order of feature 𝒇𝑖 was in the first 
quartile of the 𝜏th algorithm among the n feature selection methods used.  Then the range  
of 𝜌𝜏𝑖 can be given as: 
    0 ≤  𝜌𝜏𝑖  ≤  |F |  
Note that while there are seven feature set combinations, referring back to Table 12 one 
can see that any given feature type can only be in four of the seven combinations so that 
the actual range of 𝜌𝜏𝑖 is: 




Similar to the prior concrete example, if 𝜌𝜏𝑖  = 4 then the i
th feature of F  was ranked in 
the top 25% by each combination in which that feature type existed, i.e., it is selected as 
an important feature.  Conversely if 𝜌𝜏𝑖  = 0 then none of the combinations had it ranked 
as an important feature. 
As with dataset variation, for comparison of 𝜌𝜏𝑖 across selection methods, a 
permutation can be defined by: 
〈 𝜋(𝜏1), 𝜋(𝜏2), . . . , 𝜋(𝜏, |𝐹|) 〉 
with 
𝜌𝜋(𝜏1)  ≥  𝜌𝜋(𝜏2)  ≥ . . . ≥  𝜌𝜋(𝜏,|𝐹|) 
so that sequences can be mapped. 
K-based Selection 
The final feature subset S  is then built by varying the number of features selected, 
k, where 
𝑘𝑖  ∈  { 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 75, 100 … 𝑑𝑠′}, 1 ≤  𝑖  ≤  𝑛 
a set arbitrarily selected to provide robust coverage of the span of possible selected 
subsets, and 𝑑𝑆′ represents the largest number of features in the subset vector which can 
vary based on the prior subset selection processes and will be less than or equal to the 
original number of features in the dataset, i.e.,  𝑑𝑆′  ≤   𝑑.    
Then  
𝑺𝒊  ∈  {𝑺1, 𝑺2, 𝑺3  ⋯ 𝑺𝑛}, 1 ≤  𝑖  ≤  𝑛 
where 𝑺𝒊 is the i
th feature set with ki features. 
For an understanding of how S  is built, let us refer back to the example where 




shown in Figure 9, the first k-based subset in the example is five, labeled as FS1 for 
feature subset one.  The five top ranked features, P17, P02 , P19, P01 and P15 make up 
the feature subset.  That subset is then validated using n machine learning classifiers.  
Next, for FS2, the top 10 ranked features are used as a subset and that subset is run 
through the same n classifiers.  This is followed by FS3 and the top 15 features.  
However, at FS4 (20 features), based on the number of features down-selected as part of 
the algorithmic selection and performance selection processes, there are not enough 
features left to create a k-based subset of 20 features, so the process ends with FS4 and all 
following k-based subsets, i.e., where k >= 20 is undefined. 
Each combination of dataset and feature selection method (e.g. Permissions only and 
Information Gain) can have a different number of features available going into the k-
based selection phase which implies that each combination can have a different number 
of feature subsets used in the validation phase. 
Validation Analysis 
Experiments were run with the various machine learning techniques described 
above using the previously described malware database.  The key measurements coming 
Figure 9   
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from the experiments were number of true positives, number of true negatives, number of 
false negatives and number of false positives as shown in the confusion matrix of Figure 
10 and defined in Table 13. 
From this raw data, calculations are made for: true positive rate (TPR), false 
positive rate (FPR), accuracy, precision and F-measure. 













Table 13  
Experiment Measurements 
Measure Description 
TP True Positive # malicious apps classified as malicious apps 
TN True Negative # benign apps classified as benign apps 
FN False Negative # malicious apps classified as benign apps 
FP False Positive # benign apps classified as malicious apps 
 
Figure 10   





Two parameters that go into the calculation of F-measure are precision (p) and 
recall (r).   




Precision, also known as the positive predictor value, is described in the following 
formula. 




F-measure or F1 score is then the harmonic mean of precision and recall. 




   These five measurements are all standard metrics used in evaluation of machine 
learning tools for Android malware detection.  In a survey of measurements in use, by 
Talal, et al. (2019), the proposed measurements align with five of the top seven as shown 
in Table 14.  Also of note are the two time-based metrics: Detection time and Training 
time.  Given the current experiments execute training and detection as part of the same 
process, elapsed time is the metric of interest.   
Somewhat related in terms of system level performance, but not included in the 
table, is memory, both internal (system RAM) and external (drive space).  These were not 
included in the observations since the size of available RAM is going to affect overall 
processing time due to the operating system paging and swapping to the disk drive when 
more memory is needed than is available, so in that sense it is already part of the metric.  
Drive space was not considered simply because it is very inexpensive and should not be 
allowed to be a bottleneck in performance. 
The other three items, unchecked in the table, AOC, FNR and TNR, are all 




The results covered in the next chapter will incorporate all six metrics to provide 
consistency with other published works thus providing ample opportunity for 
comparison.   
Resources 
Systems  
The system used in the research was a Windows 10 system running on an Intel i7 
(8 core, 1.8 GHz) with 16 GB of RAM and 8 TB of external storage.   
Libraries 
As discussed in the previous section, the machine learning library used was 
Scikit-learn (scikit-learn - Machine Learning in Python, 2010).   
Datasets 
There is a maxim in machine learning that more data is always better.  When 
dealing in the arena of malware detection, the problem is that data is not easily attained.  
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The first step in the process is gathering labeled applications, i.e., labeled "malware" or 
"benign".  The next step is decompiling the apps and extracting the desired features.  This 
can be very computationally intensive with durations in terms of days or weeks 
depending on the number of apps.  Finally, the extracted data needs to be cleaned, 
encoded, and formed into datasets appropriate for input into machine learning libraries.  
Such required level of effort results in much malware research having smaller rather than 
larger datasets.  Of the literature survey conducted herein, over 70% of the papers used 
datasets containing on the order of 10,000 instances or less, and 15% of the papers 
described using 1,000 samples or less.  A major goal of this research was to use an 
exceptionally large dataset, large at least with respect to comparative research. 
In their survey on the availability of forensic datasets, Grajeda, Breitingerr and 
Baggili (2017) listed only two Android malware datasets that meet the above criteria: 
Drebin (Arp, et al., 2014)  and Andro-AutoPsy Lab (Jang, Kang, Woo, Mohaisen, & 
Kim, 2015) as shown in Table 15.  The Drebin dataset is older and even contains some 
malware samples from an older set, that of the Genome project (Zhou & Jiang, 2012). 
Andro-AutoPsy, compiled as part of the Andro-Autopsy project at the University 
of Korea Hacking and Countermeasure Research is newer and contains almost twice as 
many malware samples, all of which came from the two most respected malware 
repositories in the community, Contagio Malware Dump (Contagio Malware Dump, 
2020) and VirusShare (VirusShare, 2020).  As another level of quality check, in order to 
be included in the Andro-AutoPsy dataset, the malware had to have been diagnosed by at 
least ten different antivirus vendors.  The final collection of almost 10,000 samples span a 




were downloaded from Google Play.  Many comparisons have been made to their base 
research with some such as Park, Seo, Han, Oh and Lee (2018) using some or all of the 
dataset. 
Additional goals of this research related to datasets include using one based on 
real apps, as opposed to contrived or synthetic datasets, plus using a dataset that is 
available to other researchers for download.  Both of the datasets in Table 15 meet those 
requirements.  Given all of the above, Andro-AutoPsy was selected as the dataset for this 
research, mainly due to the quality and sample size of malware.   









As described in the section Datasets, the raw dataset consisted of 119,183 
Android applications in the form of APK files.  Of those, 9,990 were malware leaving 
109,193 as benign, or 8.4% malware overall (Table 15).  Each APK was decompiled and 
Android Permissions, Intents and API Calls were extracted from the Java source code and 
the manifest XML file.  The collection totaled over 500K Permissions, 800K Intents and 
3.7M API calls. 
At the time the experiments were run in January 2020, there were 158 
Permissions defined in Android, 295 Intents and innumerable Java API calls available.  
When those three feature groups were extracted from all the APKs, only 66 distinct 
Permissions of the 158 defined were found used.  Likewise, 139 distinct Intents of 295 
were found, and a total of 203 Android Java API calls were identified.  Thus, the 
resulting list of attributes consisted of 408 distinct Android features across the 119K 
Android apps.  Table 16 presents an updated version of Table 12 with the observed 
feature counts.  These numbers do not include the three features of contrast variables 
added as part of the performance selection phase. 
As described earlier, in order to simplify data management, all features were 




Feature Subset Selection Process 
The feature selection process was described previously in the section Feature 
Subset Selection as consisting of four phases as shown in Figure 5.  After obtaining all 
features, as listed in Table 16, the second step, algorithmic selection, consisted of 
running each of the eleven different feature selection methods against the seven feature 
type combinations.  As defined in the earlier referenced section, the maximum possible 
feature subsets at this stage was:  F  T m×r where m = 7 (dataset combinations) and r = 11 
(feature selection techniques), or 77 feature subsets.  The inclusion of the term maximum 
in the definition was due to the possible circumstance of some feature subsets being the 
same.  Upon completion of the experiments creating the feature subsets, it was observed 
that there were no duplicates, thus, phase two in the process did result in 77 distinct 
feature subsets. 
Also note that all algorithms were set to provide the maximum number of feature 
weights.  For methods such as Information Gain that implies that if 408 features go into 
the process, one will get 408 feature weights out.  However, other algorithms eliminate 
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features as part of their internal calculations and return only the features the algorithm 
calculated to be significant.  As an example, CFS has a stepwise process calculating a 
metric defined as merit per feature.  Each feature with a merit value equal to or greater 
than the previous is assumed significant.  The first time a feature’s merit value is less 
than the previous, the algorithm assumes it has determined all the significant features and 
the process stops.  So if one were to use 408 features as input to CFS, it might return 10, 
50 or 100 as significant, but most likely some number less than 408. 
The feature counts for each algorithm-dataset combination from the experiments 
are presented in Table 17 by rows and columns respectively.  Comparing the counts to 
the count of all features in Table 16 one can see that of the eleven feature selection 
algorithms, seven actually eliminated features, while four (Information Gain, Chi-Square, 
RFE - Support Vector Machine and Ridge Regression) provided feature weights for all 
features.  As an example, the dataset of all three attribute types (PIA) contained a feature 
count of 408, as described in row one of Table 16.  After algorithmic selection only the 
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subsets from Information Gain, Chi-Square, RFE-SVM and Ridge Regression still 
contain 408 features (first data column of Table 17). 
The next phase of subset selection, performance selection, eliminated attributes 
based on feature significance.  Table 18 presents the feature counts after phase three.  In 
the table, each dataset combination now has two columns, one showing the feature counts 
after algorithmic selection (𝑛𝐴𝑆) as reported in Table 17, and a second column showing 
feature count after performance selection  (𝑛𝑃𝑆). 
With respect to the C1 cohort defined earlier, significant features are features with 
weight values greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ .  Using Information Gain and the PIA dataset as an 
example, of the 408 features weighted by the Information Gain algorithm, 29 features had 
weights less than or equal to 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅  and thus were eliminated.  Or in other words, 379 
features were selected by the performance selection process as significant. 
For the C2 cohort and the three variations in outcomes, the first is where none of 
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the feature weights are greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ .  An example of that outcome is Relief and the 
PIA dataset where Relief determined 282 features to be significant, but also rated the 
random data (𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ ) at the same level. 
The second scenario is the opposite, where all of the feature weights from the 
algorithmic selection process are greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ .  An example of this outcome is CFS - 
Information Gain and the PIA dataset.  The CFS process selected 14 features as 
significant and all of those were greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ . 
The third outcome is a mix of these two extremes where some of the feature 
weights are greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅  and some are not.  An example of that situation is RFE - 
Random Forest where the RFE process selected 382 features as significant, but only 146 
of those had weights greater than 𝒘𝒱̅̅ ̅̅ . 
Based on all the feature counts presented in Table 18, we can now calculate the 
algorithm effectiveness as defined earlier in equation (8).  For the eleven feature selection 
methods and seven database combinations, the algorithm effectiveness is presented in 
Table 19.  It is easy to notice that with two of the filter-multivariate methods, CFS – 
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Information Gain and CFS – Chi-Square, are rated at the top performers at 100%.  Also 
notice the poor performance of the filter-univariate method, Relief, where all or very 
nearly all features it selected were deemed not significant.   
Table 20 removes the dataset segregation and shows the effectiveness for each 
feature selection algorithm for the total of all datasets, sorted best to worst.  As expected 
from the previous table, CFS – Information Gain and CFS – Chi-Square are rated as the 
most effective algorithms and Relief was the poorest.   
The same data aggregated by feature selection type is presented in Table 21, 
unsorted.  Due to the extremely poor performance of Relief, the third column provides 
the data without inclusion of the Relief performance numbers.  First notice that the worst 
performers are the wrapper methods.  However, the best performers change in ranking 
based on the inclusion or exclusion of Relief.  Given the few representative methods 
(three of each filter method and two embedded methods) one would have to consider this 
data inconclusive in terms of performance ranking by these group types. 
 








A secondary measure that should be considered when comparing various 
algorithms is the time it takes to compute the results.  Table 22 presents the 
computational time required for each feature selection algorithm for the total of all 
datasets, sorted fastest to slowest.  The time is shown in minutes, but the third column is a 
normalized version which abstracts the time results from the performance of the specific 
computer system used in the experiments, which did not vary throughout the process.  
One could view this as three groupings: seven of the methods are 1% each, then there is 
Table 21   
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both versions of Relief accounting for roughly 20% each, and then the outliers of RFE – 
Support Vector Machine and CFS – Information Gain.  Considering the effectiveness and 
speed together (Table 20 and Table 22 respectively) one would be tempted to label CFS - 
Chi-Square as the best performing feature selection method.  However, another point to 
consider is the number or attributes selected by each method.  In Table 18 it is obvious 
that the three CFS methods select considerably fewer features than most of the others.  
And while most if not all of the CFS algorithmic selections did pass the performance 
selection step, it does indicate that in situations where more features would improve 
classifier accuracy, CFS could be insufficient. 
For completeness, Table 23 presents the compute time aggregated by feature 
selection type.  It is a bit surprising that Wrapper methods were not the slowest, given 
they are well-known for being so given the nature of the designed, i.e., a selection 
algorithm wrapped around a machine learning classifier. 
Ranking Features 
In terms of results from the experiments, a visual representation of 𝜌𝑑𝑖 is shown in 
Figure 11 as a heatmap of the top feature rankings, segmented by feature groups, i.e., 
dataset combinations.  The shading is based on the value of 𝜌𝑑𝑖 for the specific feature.  
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In the presentation that means a lighter shade indicates lower importance and darker is 
higher importance.  The columns represent the seven different combinations of feature 
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The blank cells are datapoints where that feature was not available for ranking.  For 
example, the top item, Permission P079, INSTALL_SHORTCUT, was not in the datasets 
of IA (Intents and API calls), I (Intents only) or A (API calls only) because there were no 
Permissions in those datasets by definition.  Appendix C contains the numerical data for 
all features. 
Figure 12 is a similar heatmap but of 𝜌𝜏𝑖 which shows the top feature rankings 
segmented by feature selection algorithm.  The columns represent the eleven different 
selection methods used.  In this representation, the blank cells are datapoints where the 
feature selection algorithm eliminated that feature and therefore did not assign a weight.  
For example, the top item, Permission P079, INSTALL_SHORTCUT, was not in the 
features selected by the CFS-Relief method for any of the dataset combinations.  











With feature ranking complete, the information is now available to address the 
first two research questions. 
Research Question 1 
How does feature ranking vary when Permissions, Intents and API Calls are selected 
separately versus combined? 
To conduct this analysis, ranking of the features based on singular datasets 
(Permissions only, Intents only and API Calls only, datasets #5, #6 and #7 respectively in 
Table 12) is compared to rankings based on the combination of all datasets (dataset #1). 
By definition the combination set contains Permissions, Intents and API Calls, so in order 
to make the comparison, for each feature type, the other two features are removed from 
the combination set and it is contracted.  As an example, P008 is the 18th most significant 
feature, as shown in Figure 11, but becomes the 10th most significant feature when 
Intents and API Calls are removed from the combination set. 
 If a null hypothesis were true, there is no effect on ranking when comparing 
sequences, then the two ranking vectors would be equal.  Looking at simply the top ten 
for Permissions in each from the experimental results we can observe that: 
〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,10〉  =  〈 P079, P112, P139, P105, P104 , P100, P153, P005, P010, P008 〉 
〈𝜋51, 𝜋52, . . . , 𝜋5,10〉  =  〈 P105, P079, P139, P113, P153 , P112, P104, P005, P004, P100 〉 
so that clearly 
〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,10〉  ≠  〈𝜋51, 𝜋52, . . . , 𝜋5,10〉 
and thus, more generally 
〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,𝑘𝐹〉  ≠  〈𝜋51, 𝜋52, . . . , 𝜋5,𝑘𝐹〉 




〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,𝑘𝐹〉  ≠  〈𝜋61, 𝜋62, . . . , 𝜋6,𝑘𝐹〉 
and 
〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,𝑘𝐹〉  ≠  〈𝜋71, 𝜋72, . . . , 𝜋7,𝑘𝐹〉 
 
The null hypothesis is false. 
To quantify the effect, a similarity scoring function is required that can show 
similarity as a sequence.  One approach would be a binary scoring referred to as the 
Hamming distance in information theory.  It involves comparing the ith elements of each 
vector, but such a naïve comparison would lead to a conclusion that the two are mostly 
dissimilar, which is not the case.   
Consider again 〈𝜋11, 𝜋12, . . . , 𝜋1,10〉 and 〈𝜋51, 𝜋52, . . . , 𝜋5,10〉.  As shown in Figure 13, 
a binary ith-based comparison would indicate only two of the ten to be a match, P139 in 
position three and P005 in position eight.  This would yield a similarity score of 20% 
considering the top 10 set.  Yet when looking at the union of the set, 8 of the 10 elements 
of each are in common.  Figure 14 shows the example with the original two matches plus 
the additional six.  This would yield a similarity score of 80%.  In a set of size 66, such as 
Permissions, one would conclude that if 8 of the top 10 are the same, then there is 
certainly some similarity.  
Figure 13  
Combined to Single Set Membership Example - Exact Match 
 






However, there are limits to a strict set union analysis given that the two overall 
sets are actually equal, it is only the sequence that varies.  What is needed is a string 
comparison technique that goes beyond evaluating similarity of elements contained in the 
sets, but that applies a penalty if the like elements are not in the same position.  The 
Euclidean distance method provides just such a function, allowing the assumption that 
the sets are equal and calculating a similarity score based on how close the same elements 
are in position.  For comparing 𝜋(𝑑1𝑖) to 𝜋(𝑑5𝑖), 𝜋(𝑑6𝑖)  and 𝜋(𝑑7𝑖), the Euclidean 
distance, σ, is defined as: 
𝜎1,5  =  |𝜋(𝑑1𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑5𝑖)| , 
𝜎1,6  =  |𝜋(𝑑1𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑6𝑖)| 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜎1,7  =  |𝜋(𝑑1𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑7𝑖)| . 
The reverse, for comparing to 𝜋(𝑑5𝑖), 𝜋(𝑑6𝑖)  and 𝜋(𝑑7𝑖) to 𝜋(𝑑1𝑖) is defined as: 
𝜎5,1 =  |𝜋(𝑑5𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑1𝑖)| , 
𝜎6,1 =  |𝜋(𝑑6𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑1𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑| 
𝜎7,1 =  |𝜋(𝑑7𝑖)  −  𝜋(𝑑1𝑖)| , 
In order to achieve a cross-comparison for understanding the overall difference between 
two result sets, we take an average of the two distances per comparison.  The final 
Euclidean distance is then: : 
Figure 14   





𝜎5  =  
𝜎1,5  +  𝜎5,1
2
 , 
𝜎6  =  
𝜎1,6  +  𝜎6,1
2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜎7  =  
𝜎1,7  +  𝜎7,1
2
 . 
Figure 15 shows the example sets with the Euclidean distance added (rounded for brevity 
on the image) and illustrates the calculation for the first element.  For P079, the distance 
between the combination ranking and the singular ranking is one.  For P105, the distance 
between the combination ranking and the singular ranking is three.  Then the Euclidean 
distance for the first rank is the average, which is two. 
Noted that the two sets shown in Figure 15 are subsets (top 10  specifically) of 
features being selected and the calculations are for illustration purpose only.  All 
calculations of Euclidean distances are based on the complete selected feature sets.  For 
example, features such as P004, P008, P010, P113 are included in both complete feature 
sets but not in one or the other subsets. 
When using Euclidean distance to measure similarity, low numbers imply higher 
similarity and high numbers imply lower similarity.  But in similarity measures it is 
typical for larger values to indicate similar objects and smaller values to indicate 
Figure 15  
Combined to Single Set Membership Example – Euclidean Distance 
 











dissimilar objects, usually accomplished by taking the inverse of the distance measures.  
In addition, for the overall similarity score, being normalized would abstract the number 
of features per type from the scoring vector and make comparison among feature types 
more meaningful.  We thus define the similarity score, γ, describing the feature by 
element as: 




where 𝑛𝑓 is the number of attributes in each feature type.  The similarity score for the 
features set overall is then: 
𝛾𝑓  =  𝛾(𝜋𝑓)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
For the above concrete example  𝛾𝑃  is undefined due to the distance 
measurements extending beyond the top 10, such as P010 which is in the top 10 of the 
combined sequence, but not in the top 10 of the individual sequence.  
Moving beyond the first ten elements of the example and applying to the entire 
Permissions attribute set leads to a 𝛾𝑃 = 92% with an element-wise distribution 
presented in Figure 16.  In the chart, the element-by-element score is the dotted line.  
Given the noise evident in the score line, a smoothing function (the dark line) is applied 
in order to provide a better visualization of the result.  The smoothing function is simply 
the average of the surrounding cells, in this case the average encompasses 5% of the cells 




Figure 17 combines the same analysis with that of Intents and API Calls, plus a 
Random function to show as contrast.  The chart indicates that there is minimal effect of 
getting feature ranking from the combined dataset versus the singular datasets when 
considering the top 10 – 15 percent for all three attribute types.  This means that if one 
wants a feature set of Permissions, Intents and API Calls, and the desired feature count is 
small, then it does not matter if the feature selection process is performed with all three 
feature groups combined, or if selection is performed separately and then combined. 
However, from around 15 – 25 percent there is a sharp divergence in the 
similarity.  Intents go from mid-90s to around 80% and eventually below, operating in the 
same range as the random function.  Both Permissions and API Calls oscillate in the 
Figure 16  





upper 80s to lower 90s range with no obvious pattern.  The overall similarity of the three 
vectors, combined datasets to singular datasets, are shown in the legend of the figure, and 
are: Permissions = 92%, Intents = 83% and API Calls = 90%. 
The implication of this data is that during the feature selection phase on the 
Android platform, researchers must be cognizant of the effect of layering multiple feature 
types in their dataset, with the detrimental effects getting worse the larger the feature set 
employed.  As an example, suppose someone wants to have a dataset of Permissions and 
Intents with an attribute count of around 100.  If feature selection is performed separately 
to get the most important Permissions to use and then to get the most important Intents, 
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the feature set could be significantly different than if the Permissions and Intents were 
combined and then feature selection performed. 
Given the plethora of small sample sizes used in this research stream for 
convenience, a poor selection of the features could dramatically change the end results of 
classification. 
Research Question 2 
How does feature ranking vary across feature selection algorithms? 
Similar to the prior question, this analysis compares the feature rankings from 
each of the 11 feature selection algorithms, to the ranking from the combination of all 
features.   If there were no effect of feature selection method on feature ranking (the null 
hypothesis) then all permutations would be equal.  Table 24 presents the top ten features 
for each of the eleven feature selection methods.  Through simple observation one can 
see the null hypothesis is false.  The closest in similarity are the first two methods, 
Information Gain and Chi-Square, where the sequences of the first five elements are the 




In order to evaluate how the methods vary, the ranking based on the combination 
of all methods, 𝝅𝐶, will be used be used as a standard for comparison.  As with dataset 
evaluation, a similarity score based on Euclidean distance will be the base measurement. 
The first comparison of methods is with the three univariate filter methods: 
Information Gain, Chi-Square and Relief.  Figure 18 shows the similarity among the 
three.  Notice the remarkable consistency between Information Gain and Chi-Square 
implying that these methods are essentially interchangeable for any researchers 
considering choosing one of the two.  Also note that because they are strictly 
correlational, they provide rankings for the entire feature set whereas Relief only 
provides rankings for those features deemed significant by the algorithm, in this case, 
completing execution around 72% of Feature Count (x-axis). 
Table 24  





Figure 19 looks at the three multivariate filter methods: CFS – Information Gain, 
CFS – Chi-Square and CFS – Relief.  The base chart presents the data at the same scale 
as all the other charts in this sequence, however, due to the limited coverage over the x-
axis, an overlay is included in the figure that magnifies the area of interest.   
Recall that the CFS algorithm starts with a correlation input and the three CFS 
methods employed here are using the same three univariate methods presented as stand-
alone methods in the prior section.  Therefore, one would expect some level of 
consistency between the stand-alone results and the CFS results. 
As easily observed on the figure overlay, the consistency of CFS – Information 
Gain and CFS – Chi-Square is high.  Also notice that both methods complete execution at  
Figure 18   





just over 5% of feature count.  In other words, out of 408 attributes, these two CFS 
methods returned 22 attributes as important.  CFS – Relief diverges from the other two as 
with the univariate analysis, but returns 50 attributes as important, more than double the 
other two CFS methods. 
Similarity of the three wrapper methods, RFE – Neural Net, RFE – Random 
Forest and RFE – Support Vector Machine, is presented in Figure 20.  While there is 
some consistency between the first two in the first half of the feature set, overall, all three 
vary significantly.  Because these wrapper methods use classifiers as their search engine, 
the classifiers may perform differently based on the domain.  In a following section, 
Figure 19  





validating the feature sets with classifiers will shed light on this variation and its effect on 
accuracy. 
Finally, the last grouping, embedded methods, consisting of LASSO Regression 
and Ridge Regression, are shown in Figure 21.  We see that as expected, LASSO does 
select features, i.e., it does not provide a weighting for all features but only the ones the 
algorithm selects as significant.  As shown in the chart, it completes execution at around 
85% of feature count.  Prior to that point, up to around 60% there is a lot of consistency 
between the two methods.  Referring back to compute time in Table 22, the difference in 
that respect is minimal between the two, as well as with several other methods.  
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Researchers trying to choose between L1 and L2 regression should see little impact 
between the two unless aiming for the maximum size attribute count. 
The similarity of all eleven feature selection methods is presented in Figure 22.  
This chart is comprised of the same data presented in the previous four charts, all at the 
same scale.  The volume of data makes it somewhat challenging to discern individual 
lines but notice the shading in the upper left quadrant.  Ten out of eleven of the methods 
show a remarkable consistency given the variety of algorithms.  This area shows that 
compared to the baseline measurement, they all start at 90% similar ±5% trending down 
to 80% similar ±5% approaching one third of the attribute set count.  This shows that the 
larger the feature set size, the greater the impact based on the feature selection method.  
Figure 21  






When basing conclusions on experimental data, it is useful to understand the 
repeatability of the numbers, especially when there are outliers as RFE-SVM is in the 
previous figure.  Such outliers always beg the question as to if the data is bad or if it is a 
valid phenomenon.   
Repeatability was investigated for the eleven feature selection methods discussed 
in the previous section.  In that it is the method to be proven, and not the effect of the data 
on the method, only one of the seven dataset combinations was chosen for the 
investigation, the Permissions only version.  The assumption is that any variances in 
repeatability for one dataset would manifest itself in all seven datasets. 
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For each feature selection method, using the Permissions only dataset, the 
experiment was run ten times and the feature rankings compared.  In a perfect scenario, 
the same method would provide the same feature ranking ten times in a row.  For 
example, if Information Gain ranked P010 (ACCESS_WIFI_STATE) as the fifth most 
important Permission, the question is, would it rank it fifth every time, or could some 
variation in the process cause it to get ranked fourth or sixth, or some other ranking, 
during certain runs? 
The answer is that it varies depending on the feature selection method.  To 
analyze the effect, the standard deviation is calculated for each method for each 
significant feature, i.e., post-Performance Selection.  Table 25 offers three examples of 
the calculations.  The first column shows that Information Gain ranked feature P010 as 
fifth most important all ten iterations, thus the standard deviation is zero.  The second 
column shows that the Relief method ranked P104 either first or second for all iterations 
resulting in a standard deviation of 0.52.  The third column shows a much less desirable 
outcome with RFE – Neural Network ranking P043 in a range from 25 to 43 with a 
standard deviation of 6.72. 
Table 25  





Figure 23 is a graph of all standard deviations for all eleven feature selection 
methods.  Note that not all lines cover the full feature rank range.  This is because the 
standard deviation is only relevant for features that were selected by the process.  Refer 
back to Table 18 for the counts associated with each.  As easily determined from the 
figure, RFE – Neural Network is the poorest performer in terms of data repeatability.  
Likewise, Relief and CFS – Relief shows relatively high standard deviations especially 
considering the few number of features selected by each. 
Table 26 provides the average standard deviation for all methods.  Note that the 
top four include Information Gain, Chi-Square and then the CFS version of each.  Of 
those four, only Information Gain was not perfect repeatability, although it was perfect 
Figure 23  









for rankings 1 – 60.  Only the last four rankings showed any variation of between one to 
three ranks.   
Validating Feature Subsets 
After ranking all the features, the next step was to test the efficacy of the various 
feature subsets across the three machine learning classifiers, Random Forest, Support 
Vector Machine and Neural Network.  In many feature selection algorithms, the user 
specifies the number of features they want returned, for example, top 10 or top 20.  In 
these experiments, the number of features used with the classifiers was varied so as to 
determine the effect of feature set size on classifier accuracy.  In cases where the number 
of features to test exceeded the number provided by the performance selection step, then 
that test sequence ended. 
Table 27 presents the test matrix used, a total of 128 feature subsets.  As 
described in Performance Selection, the subset sizes were selected arbitrarily to provide 
robust coverage of the span of possible selected subsets.  Each of these were then 







validated using each of the three machine learning methods, creating 384 unique result 
sets.   
Before comparing the various feature selection methods, the data to be analyzed 
can be reduced by making the final determination on the best dataset to use.  Recall from 
our earlier discussion that seven datasets, as listed in Table 16, have been used 
throughout the experiments.  Each of these were used separately as the dataset for each 
feature selection method (Table 10) and each machine learning algorithm (Table 11).   
Figure 24 shows a comparison in classifier accuracy of the seven datasets using 
Chi-Square as the feature selection method and Random Forest as the machine learning 
classifier.  This is but one instance of the 33 variations (11 feature selection methods x 3 
machine learning algorithms).  It is clear from the chart that the dataset PIA (Permissions, 
Intents and API Calls) performs best, although not significantly.  Notice that five of the 
seven variations achieve over 99% accuracy, with the lowest being API Calls alone.  The 
two between 98% and 99% are Permissions alone and Intents alone. 
Table 27  





The horizonal axis in this chart is feature set count.  Recall that it was also a 
variable in the test matrix.  The effects of feature count will be discussed later.  The task 
at hand is to identify the dataset to carry forward into further analysis. 
Considering all the data, with respect to the dataset analysis, Chi-Square is 
representative of the majority of the results.  Figure 25 shows RFE – Neural Net with a 
Random Forest classifier and Figure 26 shows the same with Ridge Regression.   
Notice that the dataset performance order is exactly the same in all three charts.  
There were a couple of instances where PIA was not the top performer, but those were 
cases with sparse data and no convergence on feature count.     
To determine if there is an effect on ordering based on the classifier, Figure 27 
shows the dataset comparison of accuracy using Chi-Square as the feature selection 
methods and Support Vector Machine (SVM) as the classifier and Figure 28 shows the 
same but with a Neural Network as the classifier. 
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Figure 28  


























Note that there is a difference in accuracy among the three classifiers, to be 
discussed later, but with regard to the selection of the optimal dataset, the consensus for 
all three classifiers is that PIA performs best. 
Charts for all dataset accuracy comparisons for the various feature selection 
methods and the three machine learning classifiers are presented in Appendix E.  Certain 
variations, such as CFS – Chi-Square with Random Forest are not charted there due to a 
lack of data points that resulted from the three-phase selection process as shown in Table 
27. 
The final data stratification to look at is the metric.  To this point the metric 
discussed has been accuracy.  The actual raw data for the experiments are TP, TN, FN 
and FP (Table 12) which all go into the calculation of accuracy.  All of the other metrics 
of interest, true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), precision and F-measure 
(F1), defined in the Analysis section, use the same raw data so it is no surprise that the 
trends are the same.   
For completeness, these metrics for Chi-Square and Random Forest are presented 
next.  First, Figure 29 shows true positive rate and Figure 30 shows false positive rate.   
As one would expect, the two have an inverse relationship.  The dataset PIA has 
the highest TPR and lowest FPR, respectively. 
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Figure 31  



























Figure 32  































With this comparison complete, it has been shown that when evaluating the three 
machine learning classifiers against the eleven feature selection methods, of the seven 
dataset combinations, the best performance is achieved using PIA (Permissions, Intents 
and API Calls) together as opposed to any other available combination and accuracy is a 
representative metric. 
Research Question 3 
How does machine learning model accuracy vary across machine learning algorithms 
and feature selection algorithms? 
The variation in model accuracy across machine learning algorithms for each 
feature selection method is presented in Table 28.  These data are for the highest accuracy 
achieved across the attribute count spectrum. 
The overall variation in accuracy across machine learning algorithms is shown in 
Figure 33.  The vertical axis represents the average accuracy across all eleven feature 
selection methods.  The figure shows that Random Forest has higher accuracy than SVM, 
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which in turn has higher accuracy than the Neural Networks.  But one must also look at 
the scale.  Compared to Random Forest, SVM is only 0.68% less, and Neural Net is 
1.37% less.  
Figure 34 shows the variation in accuracy for each classifier as well but broken 
out by feature selection method.  For all eleven methods, the order of highest accuracy is 
the same, Random Forest, SVM and Neural Net, although divergence in the percent 
difference can be observed in some.  If the null hypothesis were true, i.e., there is no 
effect of feature selection algorithm on classifier accuracy, then one would expect the 
ordering of highest accuracy to lowest accuracy to vary randomly across the 11 
algorithms, but clearly as shown in Figure 34, the ordering is consistent with Random 
Forest always exhibiting the highest accuracy, followed by SVM and Neural Net.  The 
null hypothesis is false. 
To better demonstrate the difference in algorithms by feature selection method, 
Figure 35 shows the percentage decrease in accuracy for SVM and Neural Net compared  
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to Random Forest.  Out of the eleven feature selection methods, four are noticeably lower 
in accuracy, Relief and the three multivariate filter methods based on CFS. 
These are the same feature selection methods that stand out in Table 28 depicting 
the number of attributes selected for feature subsets.  This phenomenon will be 
investigated in more detail next. 
Research Question 4 
How does feature set size affect model accuracy across feature selection methods? 
Given that feature set size was a variable in the experiments, there exists cases 
where a viable solution exists at a smaller set size than the largest tested.  As an example, 
Figure 24 shows a graph of accuracy using Chi-Square as the feature selection method 
and Random Forest as the validating classifier.  While feature set sizes were tested up 
through a set size of 375, it is clear that the solution converged on an acceptable accuracy 
level significantly before 375.  In this context convergence is the point at which further 
improvements in accuracy are not significant and is defined by: 
∆ 𝑦 ≤ 𝜏  ⇒   𝑐 =  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
where ∆ 𝑦 is the change in accuracy between feature set sizes, 𝜏 is the target value (in 
these experiments arbitrarily set to 0.005) and c is the boolean convergence value. 
As shown in earlier data plots, there are some cases where accuracy oscillates and 
would never converge according to the above formulation.  To remedy those situations in 
order to provide consistency for comparison, a smoothing function was used to produce a 
curve through the discrete data points.  Figure 36 is one example using Chi-Square as the 




represents the actual data from the experiments and the dashed line represents points 
along the curve produced by the smoothing function and used for convergence analysis. 
Recall there were also test cases where there were minimal valid feature set sizes, 
as shown in Table 28 with a case in point being Relief having only a test case of feature 
set size of five.  In such instances, convergence has no meaning.  
In terms of a null hypothesis, i.e., there is no effect of feature set size on model 
accuracy, one intuitively knows this to be false just considering a feature set size of one, 
to a feature set size of 10 or 100 or more; clearly there would be differences in results.  
But regardless of intuition, the null hypothesis is shown to be false by the data presented 
in Figure 36 with accuracy varying significantly as set size increases. 
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A convergence data summary for test cases using the full dataset (Permissions, 
Intents and API Calls – PIA) is presented in Figure 37.  The dark squares indicate points 
where the solution was not converged.  The lighter squares are with a converged solution 
and the lighter squares with a star indicate the first data point where the solution 
converged.  Clear squares are where there was no valid feature set. 
For cases that did not converge, such as CFS-InfoGain and RF, the accuracy of 
the last datapoint is shown along with the  ∆ 𝑦 at that point. 
The data shows that classifier accuracy significantly varies based on the feature 
set size.  For example, in the first item, Information Gain and Random Forest, using any 
feature set size less than 60 will result in a suboptimal accuracy performance.  Also note 
that the optimal feature set size varies with the classifier.  This is true in all cases with the 
exception of the embedded methods (LASSO Regression and Ridge Regression) where 
convergence occurs at approximately the same point. 
Feature Summary 
Research Question 5 
Among Permissions, Intents and API Calls, what are the important features? 
It has been shown above that 1) using Permissions, Intents and API Calls together 
are better than any of the three in other combinations, and 2) that optimal feature set size 
can vary significantly with feature selection method and is an important parameter to 
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Figure 38 plots the 20 convergence points from Figure 37 with a curve fit added 
to depict a continuous function.  Clearly there is a trend, and what it indicates is that if 
one wants to ensure that their combination of feature selection method and classifier is 
optimized in terms of convergence, then using the top 200 or above Permissions, Intents 
and API Calls is the correct approach.  For convenience, these top 200 attributes are 
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Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
The following provides the major conclusions of this study.  The methods used 
are generic to the field, but these conclusions are specific to the domain of feature 
selection for malware detection on the Android platform. 
Permissions vs Intents vs API Calls 
Considering the use of Android Permissions, Intents and API Calls as features, 
using all three provides the best results.  Additionally, using a combination of any two of 
the feature types provides better results than using any one of them alone. 
Feature Selection Using Multiple Feature Types 
When using a combination of the three feature types, performing feature selection 
on the combination provides better results than performing feature selection on each type 
and then combining the results to create a final feature set. 
Feature Set Size 
Feature set size is important.  While one specific test case did produce optimal 
results with only the top 40 features, in general best results are achieved with a 200 or 
greater feature count.  If a feature set is used that is larger than the minimum required, 
accuracy does not decrease, so it is safe to use more features than absolutely required 




Feature Selection Methods to be Avoided 
Relief proved to be a poor performer of feature selection.  In general, the features 
it selects do not outperform randomly selected features.  This could be attributable to the 
random row selection function in the algorithm.  When used with a large sample size 
dataset and following conventional parameter settings of 10 iterations, there may be too 
much randomness to allow consistent selection of appropriate features.  A study of 
varying dataset size and iteration count could shed light on the problem. 
Given the performance of Relief, it is no surprise that CFS-Relief performed 
poorly as well.  However, regardless of the base correlation method used, CFS should 
also be avoided as a feature selection method.  While the features it selects are 
significant, the algorithm stops too soon thus providing an insufficient feature set size.  
The algorithm is deterministic in nature and thus repeatable based on the same correlation 
input, so overcoming its shortcomings will require revisiting the design. 
RFE – Neural Net (Perceptron) as a feature selection method is unpredictable.  
While the accuracy results were acceptable in these experiments, the repeatability was 
poor thus implying that not all feature sets selected would be acceptable. 
Acceptable Feature Selection Methods 
Information Gain, Chi-Square, Ridge Regression and LASSO Regression are 
excellent feature selection methods with minimal variance across machine learning 
classifiers.  Additionally, all four methods take little computational time.   
The main characteristic these methods have in common are that they all provide 
weight factors for a large percentage of the feature input vectors.  In fact, the first three 




to zero.  This implies that researchers seeking the highest fidelity should not rely on 
feature selection algorithms to specify the feature count, but rather should use some form 
of performance selection and convergence analysis as shown in this report. 
The two wrapper methods RFE–Random Forest and RFE–Support Vector 
Machine provide acceptable results, but those results vary more with the machine 
learning classifier used compared to those listed in the previous paragraph.  However, 
RFE-Support Vector Machine was significantly slower in terms of compute time 
compare to all other acceptable feature selection methods. 
Accuracy 
While it was not a goal of this research to find a best performing feature set or a 
best performing machine learning model, even without fine tuning of parameters, the six 
acceptable feature selection methods averaged 99.6% accuracy with a Random Forest 
classifier, 99.1% accuracy with a Support Vector Machine classifier and 98.6% accuracy 
with a Neural Net (Perceptron) classifier. 
Implications 
This work is the most exhaustive analysis of Android feature selection in this field 
of study to the best of our knowledge.  It can be used as a guide for researchers 
performing feature selection in the domain or a reference for researchers who want to 
skip feature selection as a process and simply use a feature set based on the features listed 
in the document. 
Previous studies in the field that made use of the five feature selection methods 
described as to be avoided or used feature set sizes too small, as defined herein, should 




 Many of the insights and conclusions presented here have the potential to be 
applied to other malware/anomaly detection tasks, or more broadly, other pattern 
recognitions problems, especially with regard to researchers needing to be cautious of 
blindly relying on feature selection algorithms.    
As shown, Relief, CFS, RFE-NN in general are not suitable for feature selection 
in domains with large feature sets given their propensity to provide an insufficient feature 
count.  On the other hand, Information Gain, Chi-Square, LASSO Regression and Ridge 
Regression are excellent feature selection choices assuming the full weight vectors are 
used appropriately with additional analysis as demonstrated. 
Although evaluating performance of machine learning classifiers was not in the 
scope of this research, it was observed that Random Forest performed exceptionally well, 
which is consistent with other published work in the domain as discussed.  Of the three 
techniques used, Random Forest was the only ensemble method, leading to the conjecture 
that other ensemble approaches might perform just as well or better. 
Recommendations 
Future Work 
This work encompassed a large scope, but as with any research project, there are 
additional pathways that could be explored.  One such path would be to expand the 
experiments by adding feature selection algorithms, such as using Pearson’s Correlation 
or RFE with other embedded classifiers.  One could also vary the parameter settings on 
the wrapper and embedded methods to see how such variations would affect selection. 
Likewise, feature set validation with additional classifiers would be interesting as well as 




 Another path would be to expand on the analysis such as varying the ensemble 
voting scheme using quartile membership or even using other similarity algorithms in 
addition to Euclidian distance.  These would not change the underlying experimental data 
but might provide additional insights and interpretations. 
A more extreme path would be to explore improving the Relief and CFS 
algorithms to determine if they can be improved for use in this domain. 
Finally, even with the large size of the dataset, one could update it with more 
recent benign and malware samples. 
Best Practices 
It is clear from the results reported herein that researchers in the Android malware 
detection field need to pay significant attention to feature selection.  One can use this 
work to explore and expand feature selection or simply pick from its recommendations.  
But using arbitrary methods such as using only Permissions categorized as Dangerous by 
Google (Permissions Overview, 2019) or having a feature selection method return its top 
10 or top 20 features is not best practice. 
Summary 
Introduction 
Android has been Google’s mobile operating system from 2008 to the present.  It 
currently holds approximately 85% of the world market with the only other relevant 
competitor being Apple's iOS.  Android is open source with an open ecosystem which 
tends to make it an easy target for malware perpetrators. 
Detection of malicious activity on computers has a significant research stream 




with Expert Systems and eventually evolved into using machine learning and data mining 
techniques.  Malware detection on mobile devices typically takes a host-based approach, 
evaluating the apps on the system, as opposed to network-based which would be less 
effective given the on-again, off-again nature of mobile network connectivity. 
When developing machine learning models, one initial, critical step is feature 
selection, the process of identifying a subset of relevant features for use in construction of 
the model.  For Android, the features most often used are Permissions, Intents and API 
Calls, individually, together or in some combination.  But there are a number of other 
features used less frequently such as hardware used, Android App Components, Control 
Flow Graphs, URLs and many others.  The problem is there is no consensus in the 
research community as to the key Android feature types for machine learning models.  
Even just considering the top three of Permissions, Intents and API Call, those are just 
categories.  There are hundreds of discrete attributes in each category. 
Typical feature selection approaches in the community include using the subset of 
Permissions categorized as Dangerous by Google, hand selecting features based on 
domain knowledge, or even picking a method such as Information Gain and simply 
taking the top n-ranked features.  Unfortunately, there is no definitive study on Android 
feature selection for researchers to be guided by or use as a reference. 
Such is the goal of this research, to advance the state of the industry’s knowledge 
on feature sets used for Android static analysis malware detection.  The approach was to 
use a broad test matrix consisting of all combinations of Permissions, Intents and API 




those validated with multiple machine learning classifiers.  Then, using the experimental 
results, answer the following five questions: 
1) How does feature ranking vary when Permissions, Intents and API Calls are 
selected separately versus combined? 
2) How does feature ranking vary across feature selection algorithms? 
3) How does machine learning model accuracy vary across machine learning 
algorithms and feature selection algorithms? 
4) How does feature set size affect model accuracy across feature selection methods? 
5) Among Permissions, Intents and API Calls, what are the important features? 
Methodology 
Based on common usage in the community as well as to use several types of 
feature selection algorithms, eleven different feature selection methods were chosen.  The 




Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) with Chi-Square 
Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) with Information Gain 
Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) with Relief 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) using Neural Network (Perceptron) 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) using Random Forest 
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) using Support Vector Machine 
Lasso regression (L1 regularization) 
Ridge regression (L2 regularization) 
which encompasses multiple examples of univariate methods, multivariate methods, 




To validate the results from the various feature selection methods, it was desired 
to use multiple machine learning classifiers so as to demonstrate independence.  The 
algorithms selected were: 
Random Forest 
Support Vector Machine 
Neural Network (Perceptron) 
which also matched the classifiers used as the search engines in the RFE experiments. 
The experiments used a large dataset of 119k Android applications, the Andro-
AutoPsy set from the University of Korea Hacking and Countermeasure Research lab.  
Each app was decompressed and decompiled using an open-source tool called Jadx.  
Instances of Permissions, Intents and API Calls were extracted from all of the apps and 
transformed into a binary encoded dataset indicating the existence or lack of existence of 
each attribute in each app.  In addition to the extracted features, each dataset contained 
three columns of random data as contrast variables against which we could compare 
feature selection results.   
Each of the seven combinations of feature types (Permissions, Intents and API 
Calls) were used as input into the 11 different feature selection methods.  The weight 
values returned by each algorithm was used to infer a ranking, most important to least 
important.  Also, each attribute weight was compared to the weight the feature selection 
algorithm gave to the random data, and any attribute whose weight was equal to or less 
than the average weight of those random contrast variables was eliminated. 
Finally, k-based feature subsets were created based on the rankings of the features 




from each feature selection method for each dataset combination, were then used as input 
for the three machine learning classifiers. 
Results 
For the feature vectors created from the experiments, Euclidean distance was 
employed to evaluate similarity.  In terms of dataset combinations, it was shown that 
there was significant similarity in the first 10 to 15 percent of each vector when 
comparing the features selected from the combined datasets (Permissions, Intents and 
API Calls together) versus selecting from the feature types individually.  But after 15 
percent there is significant divergence. 
Euclidean distance was also used to compare the similarity of the feature vectors 
representing the various feature selection methods.  This demonstrated that Information 
Gain and Chi-Square produced very similar feature sets followed closely by the two 
embedded methods.  Overall, ten of the feature selection methods exhibited reasonable 
similarity in the first 10 to 15 percent of the vectors with the one exception being RFE-
SVM. 
After using all the feature subsets with the three different machine learning 
classifiers, it was shown that using a combination of Permissions, Intents and API Calls 
produced higher accuracy than using any of those alone or in any other combination.  It 
was also demonstrated that when using multiple feature types, feature selection should be 
performed on the types combined, not separately and then combined. 
The k-based selection experiments showed that feature set size is important, and 





With regard to efficacy of the various feature selection methods, the data 
indicated that Relief, the three CFS based methods and RFE-Neural Network were not 
satisfactory and therefore should be avoided.  Conversely the data showed that 
Information Gain, Chi-Square, LASSO Regression and Ridge Regression are very good 
feature selection methods, and RFE–Random Forest and RFE–Support Vector Machine 
are moderately good with the latter being least so due to the computational time it 
requires. 
Data and Code Repositories 
All the data and custom Python code used in these experiments is available to the 
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Heatmap Data of Feature Ranking by Dataset. 
ID Feature Name PIA PI PA IA  P I A 
P079 INSTALL_SHORTCUT 9 10 10   10   
P112 RECEIVE_SMS 8 11 9   11   
P139 SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 9 10 10   10   
I078 ACTION_PACKAGE_ADDED 9 10  9   11  
I106 ACTION_SENDTO 9 11  9   10  
P105 READ_SMS 9 10 9   10   
I012 ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED 8 10  9   11  
A111 android.net.Proxy 9  9 10    10 
I153 CATEGORY_HOME 9 9  9   10  
A180 android.telephony 8  9 10    10 
P104 READ_PHONE_STATE 7 10 8   11   
A022 android.app.PendingIntent 9  9 9    9 
A045 android.content.Intent.ShortcutIconResource 8  9 9    10 
P100 READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 8 9 8   10   
P153 WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 8 8 9   9   
P005 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 7 9 8   8   
P010 ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 5 9 7   11   
P008 ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 6 9 7   9   
A003 android.annotation.TargetApi 8  8 7    8 
A025 android.app.Service 7  8 8    8 
A051 android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo 8  8 8    7 
A055 android.content.pm.PackageInfo 9  7 7    8 
P004 ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 6 7 8   9   
P082 KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 5 10 5   10   
A154 android.provider.Browser 6  7 7    9 
P006 ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS 4 8 6   10   
P110 RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 7 7 6   8   
I131 ACTION_WEB_SEARCH 6 7  7   8  
A046 android.content.IntentFilter 6  8 7    7 
A061 android.content.pm.ServiceInfo 6  7 7    8 
P099 READ_CONTACTS 6 8 4   9   
A062 android.content.pm.Signature 7  6 6    8 
A128 android.os.IBinder 8  7 8    4 
P113 RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 6 7 6   7   
I026 ACTION_DELETE 5 7  5   9  
I079 ACTION_PACKAGE_CHANGED 5 8  5   8  
I083 ACTION_PACKAGE_INSTALL 6 7  6   7  
I090 ACTION_PICK 5 7  7   7  
A039 android.content.ContentUris 6  8 4    8 
A116 android.net.wifi 4  6 6    10 
A134 android.os.Parcel 4  8 7    7 
A191 android.util.Log 6  5 7    8 
P045 BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 4 7 6   8   
P053 CALL_PHONE 4 8 5   8   
P061 CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 6 8 3   8   
I085 ACTION_PACKAGE_REMOVED 6 8  4   7  
I086 ACTION_PACKAGE_REPLACED 5 8  5   7  
A004 android.app.ActivityManager 5  5 6    9 
A032 android.content.BroadcastReceiver 5  6 6    8 
A130 android.os.Looper 5  8 4    8 
P111 RECEIVE_MMS 5 7 5   7   
P147 VIBRATE 4 7 4   9   
I027 ACTION_DEVICE_STORAGE_LOW 4 7  5   8  
I029 ACTION_DIAL 4 7  4   9  
I105 ACTION_SEND 3 8  4   9  
I159 CATEGORY_OPENABLE 3 7  5   9  
A194 android.util.Pair 6  5 7    6 




I044 ACTION_INSERT_OR_EDIT 3 8  4   8  
I124 ACTION_USER_PRESENT 5 6  5   7  
I126 ACTION_VIEW 4 5  6   8  
I144 CATEGORY_BROWSABLE 3 7  5   8  
A024 android.app.SearchManager 6  5 5    7 
A073 android.content.UriMatcher 4  8 4    7 
A075 android.hardware.Camera 3  4 8    8 
A085 android.media.AudioManager 5  4 6    8 
A101 android.net.ConnectivityManager 7  7 5    4 
P134 SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS 4 7 4   7   
P148 WAKE_LOCK 4 4 5   9   
I101 ACTION_SCREEN_OFF 2 7  4   9  
A021 android.app.Notification 4  6 5    7 
A030 android.content.ActivityNotFoundException 4  4 7    7 
A047 android.content.IntentSender 4  6 5    7 
A064 android.content.res.AssetManager 5  7 4    6 
A120 android.os.CancellationSignal 5  5 6    6 
A135 android.os.Parcelable 4  3 7    8 
A151 android.preference.Preference 4  6 5    7 
A176 android.support.v4.util.SimpleArrayMap 5  5 6    6 
P044 BLUETOOTH 4 5 4   8   
P058 CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 2 8 3   8   
P062 CLEAR_APP_CACHE 2 7 4   8   
P081 INTERNET 2 7 3   9   
P088 MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS 3 8 2   8   
I091 ACTION_PICK_ACTIVITY 2 7  5   7  
I130 ACTION_WALLPAPER_CHANGED 3 5  5   8  
I154 CATEGORY_INFO 3 7  3   8  
I158 CATEGORY_MONKEY 2 7  4   8  
A040 android.content.ContentValues 5  5 5    6 
A068 android.content.res.XmlResourceParser 3  4 7    7 
A081 android.location.Geocoder 3  6 4    8 
A197 android.util.SparseBooleanArray 4  6 5    6 
P059 CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 2 8 2   8   
P114 RECORD_AUDIO 3 5 4   8   
I022 ACTION_CREATE_SHORTCUT 2 5  6   7  
I102 ACTION_SCREEN_ON 2 7  3   8  
I108 ACTION_SET_WALLPAPER 2 6  5   7  
A056 android.content.pm.PackageManager 5  5 5    5 
A093 android.media.MediaPlayer 2  5 6    7 
A127 android.os.Handler 4  5 5    6 
A143 android.os.StatFs 4  4 8    4 
P050 BROADCAST_STICKY 2 6 3   8   
P074 GET_PACKAGE_SIZE 1 7 4   7   
P156 WRITE_SETTINGS 3 5 3   8   
I010 ACTION_BATTERY_LOW 3 5  3   8  
I011 ACTION_BATTERY_OKAY 4 4  3   8  
I014 ACTION_CALL 3 6  3   7  
I019 ACTION_CLOSE_SYSTEM_DIALOGS  8  3   8  
I023 ACTION_DATE_CHANGED 1 6  4   8  
I147 CATEGORY_DEFAULT 3 5  2   9  
A007 android.app.AlarmManager 5  4 4    6 
A008 android.app.AlertDialog 4  4 6    5 
A037 android.content.ContentProvider 3  6 5    5 
A110 android.net.NetworkInfo 5  4 5    5 
A125 android.os.Environment 4  4 4    7 
A186 android.util.DisplayMetrics 5  4 5    5 
A202 android.util.Xml.Encoding 4  4 6    5 
P133 SET_WALLPAPER 2 5 3   8   
I058 ACTION_MEDIA_BUTTON 1 7  3   7  
I061 ACTION_MEDIA_MOUNTED 1 6  3   8  
A060 android.content.pm.ResolveInfo 1  6 4    7 
A066 android.content.res.Configuration 4  4 5    5 
A079 android.location.Address 4  3 5    6 
A132 android.os.Message 4  4 5    5 




A148 android.preference.DialogPreference 4  3 5    6 
P067 DISABLE_KEYGUARD 1 7 2   7   
P092 NFC 3 4 3   7   
P115 REORDER_TASKS 3 4 3   7   
P125 SET_ALARM 2 5 3   7   
P157 WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS 3 3 3   8   
I033 ACTION_EDIT 1 5  2   9  
I037 ACTION_GET_CONTENT 1 4  4   8  
I103 ACTION_SEARCH 1 6  2   8  
I104 ACTION_SEARCH_LONG_PRESS  6  3   8  
I150 CATEGORY_EMBED  6  3   8  
I155 CATEGORY_LAUNCHER 1 6  2   8  
A014 android.app.IntentService 4  4 4    5 
A080 android.location.Criteria 5  4 4    4 
A083 android.location.Location 5  2 6    4 
A094 android.media.MediaRecorder 2  4 4    7 
A123 android.os.DeadObjectException 4  2 5    6 
A138 android.os.Process 4  4 5    4 
A146 android.os.Vibrator 2  3 7    5 
A157 android.provider.Contacts 3  5 3    6 
A158 android.provider.MediaStore 2  3 4    8 
A161 android.sax 3  4 5    5 
A201 android.util.Xml 4  4 4    5 
P055 CAMERA 1 3 3   9   
P106 READ_SYNC_SETTINGS 1 4 3   8   
I049 ACTION_MAIN 2 5  2   7  
I065 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_SCAN_FILE 1 8     7  
A010 android.app.Application 3  4 4    5 
A031 android.content.AsyncQueryHandler 3  6 2    5 
A038 android.content.ContentResolver 2  5 3    6 
A043 android.content.DialogInterface 6  6 2    2 
A071 android.content.SharedPreferences 3  4 5    4 
A118 android.os.Binder 2  4 3    7 
A160 android.provider.Settings 4  4 4    4 
P028 BIND_INPUT_METHOD 1 4 3   7   
P060 CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE 2 3 3   7   
I018 ACTION_CHOOSER  4  3   8  
I043 ACTION_INSERT  6  1   8  
I094 ACTION_POWER_USAGE_SUMMARY 1 6     8  
I096 ACTION_PROVIDER_CHANGED  7  1   7  
I111 ACTION_SYNC  6  1   8  
A019 android.app.LocalActivityManager 4  4 3    4 
A053 android.content.pm.IPackageStatsObserver 4  4 4    3 
A063 android.content.res.AssetFileDescriptor 4  4 3    4 
A078 android.hardware.Sensor 2  4 4    5 
P015 BATTERY_STATS 1 4 2   7   
P072 GET_ACCOUNTS  4 1   9   
I060 ACTION_MEDIA_EJECT  5  3   6  
I066 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_STARTED  6     8  
I080 ACTION_PACKAGE_DATA_CLEARED  7     7  
I107 ACTION_SEND_MULTIPLE 2 4  1   7  
I113 ACTION_TIMEZONE_CHANGED  6     8  
I132 CATEGORY_ALTERNATIVE 1 5  1   7  
A067 android.content.res.Resources 2  4 2    6 
A136 android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor 3  3 4    4 
A141 android.os.ResultReceiver 1  4 2    7 
A177 android.support.v4.util.SparseArrayCompat 3  4 3    4 
A196 android.util.SparseArray 2  4 3    5 
A200 android.util.TypedValue 4  3 3    4 
P043 BIND_WALLPAPER  5    8   
P096 PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS  6    7   
P097 READ_CALENDAR  4 1   8   
P150 WRITE_CALENDAR  2 3   8   
P152 WRITE_CONTACTS  3 1   9   
I129 ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND  6     7  




A016 android.app.LauncherActivity 3  4 3    3 
A044 android.content.Entity 4  3 3    3 
A097 android.media.Ringtone   2 3    8 
A109 android.net.MailTo 3  2 4    4 
A112 android.net.SSLCertificateSocketFactory 2  4 3    4 
A114 android.net.Uri 2  3 4    4 
A115 android.net.UrlQuerySanitizer 3  3 3    4 
A129 android.os.IInterface 3  2 3    5 
A139 android.os.RemoteCallbackList 4  4 3    2 
A140 android.os.RemoteException 4  3 3    3 
A170 android.support.v4.os.EnvironmentCompat 2  4 3    4 
P025 BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN  4    8   
P107 READ_SYNC_STATS 1 4 1   6   
P151 WRITE_CALL_LOG 1 3 1   7   
I008 ACTION_ATTACH_DATA  4     8  
I015 ACTION_CALL_BUTTON  4  1   7  
I064 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_FINISHED  4     8  
I087 ACTION_PACKAGE_RESTARTED 1 2  1   8  
I100 ACTION_RUN  5     7  
A005 android.app.admin.DeviceAdminReceiver 4  2 3    3 
A036 android.content.ComponentName 2  2 2    6 
A059 android.content.pm.ProviderInfo 3  3 4    2 
A074 android.database 2  4 2    4 
A082 android.location.Gps 1  3 3    5 
A119 android.os.Build 2  2 3    5 
A145 android.os.SystemClock 2  3 3    4 
A147 android.preference.CheckBoxPreference 3  2 4    3 
A203 android.webkit 2  3 3    4 
P016 BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE  4    7   
P034 BIND_REMOTEVIEWS  3 1   7   
P064 DELETE_CACHE_FILES 1 3    7   
I002 ACTION_ALL_APPS  4  1   6  
I016 ACTION_CAMERA_BUTTON  3  1   7  
I020 ACTION_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED  5  1   5  
I024 ACTION_DEFAULT  2  1   8  
I035 ACTION_EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_UNAVAILABLE  3     8  
I042 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED  3     8  
I062 ACTION_MEDIA_NOFS 1 2  1   7  
I069 ACTION_MEDIA_UNMOUNTED  4     7  
I099 ACTION_REBOOT  3     8  
I115 ACTION_TIME_TICK 1 2     8  
I161 CATEGORY_SAMPLE_CODE  3     8  
A054 android.content.pm.LabeledIntent 2  2 3    4 
A070 android.content.ServiceConnection 3  2 2    4 
A117 android.nfc 1  2 4    4 
A124 android.os.Debug 1  4 1    5 
A153 android.provider.BaseColumns 2  3 2    4 
A163 android.service.wallpaper.WallpaperService 1  3 2    5 
P076 GLOBAL_SEARCH  2 1   7   
I003 ACTION_ANSWER  2  1   7  
I034 ACTION_EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_AVAILABLE  2     8  
I041 ACTION_HEADSET_PLUG  5     5  
I047 ACTION_LOCALE_CHANGED  3     7  
I057 ACTION_MEDIA_BAD_REMOVAL  4     6  
I063 ACTION_MEDIA_REMOVED  3     7  
I117 ACTION_UID_REMOVED  2  1   7  
I163 CATEGORY_SELECTED_ALTERNATIVE  2  1   7  
I164 CATEGORY_TAB 1 2  1   6  
A002 android.annotation.SuppressLint 2  2 3    3 
A009 android.app.AlertDialog.Builder 2  3 2    3 
A026 android.app.TabActivity 2  2 1    5 
A057 android.content.pm.PackageStats   2 2    6 
A105 android.net.http.SslCertificate   4 2    4 
A126 android.os.FileObserver 2  3 2    3 
A169 android.support.v4.media.TransportMediator 2  3 2    3 




A199 android.util.StateSet   3 2    5 
I009 ACTION_BATTERY_CHANGED  2  1   6  
I046 ACTION_INSTALL_PACKAGE 1 3     5  
I056 ACTION_MANAGE_PACKAGE_STORAGE  2     7  
I068 ACTION_MEDIA_UNMOUNTABLE  3     6  
I070 ACTION_MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED    2   7  
I112 ACTION_SYSTEM_TUTORIAL  4  1   4  
I119 ACTION_UMS_DISCONNECTED  3     6  
I149 CATEGORY_DEVELOPMENT_PREFERENCE  2  1   6  
I167 CATEGORY_UNIT_TEST  3  1   5  
A001 android.accounts 3  1 2    3 
A012 android.app.DownloadManager   2 2    5 
A069 android.content.SearchRecentSuggestionsProvider 1  2 1    5 
A185 android.util.Config   3 1    5 
P012 ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION  1 1   6   
P013 ADD_VOICEMAIL  1 1   6   
P041 BIND_VPN_SERVICE  1 1   6   
P098 READ_CALL_LOG  1    7   
P146 USE_SIP   1   7   
I013 ACTION_BUG_REPORT  2     6  
I059 ACTION_MEDIA_CHECKING  1     7  
I067 ACTION_MEDIA_SHARED  1     7  
I073 ACTION_NEW_OUTGOING_CALL  2     6  
I118 ACTION_UMS_CONNECTED  1     7  
I148 CATEGORY_DESK_DOCK 1      7  
I151 CATEGORY_FRAMEWORK_INSTRUMENTATION_TEST  3     5  
I165 CATEGORY_TEST  2     6  
A035 android.content.ComponentCallbacks 1  1 1    5 
A049 android.content.OperationApplicationException 1  2 2    3 
A076 android.hardware.display.DisplayManager 1  2 3    2 
A096 android.media.RemoteControlClient 1  2 3    2 
A098 android.media.SoundPool 1  1 2    4 
A142 android.os.ServiceManager 1  1 1    5 
A166 android.speech.tts.TextToSpeech   1 2    5 
A181 android.util.AndroidException   2 1    5 
A183 android.util.AttributeSet 2  2 2    2 
A184 android.util.Base64   2 1    5 
A198 android.util.SparseIntArray   3 3    2 
P031 BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE  1    6   
P037 BIND_TEXT_SERVICE 1  1   5   
P094 PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS      7   
I030 ACTION_DOCK_EVENT       7  
A013 android.app.Instrumentation 1   3    3 
A018 android.app.LoaderManager 1  1 1    4 
A050 android.content.pm.ActivityInfo   3 1    3 
A058 android.content.pm.PermissionInfo 3  1 2    1 
A065 android.content.res.ColorStateList 1  2     4 
A099 android.media.ThumbnailUtils   2 1    4 
A102 android.net.DhcpInfo   1     6 
A167 android.support.v4.app 2  1 2    2 
I028 ACTION_DEVICE_STORAGE_OK       6  
I145 CATEGORY_CAR_DOCK       6  
A103 android.net.http.AndroidHttpClient 2   3    1 
A122 android.os.CountDownTimer 3   3     
A131 android.os.MemoryFile   1     5 
A149 android.preference.EditTextPreference 1  2 1    2 
A174 android.support.v4.util.LogWriter 1  1 1    3 
A192 android.util.LruCache 1  1 1    3 
I001 ACTION_AIRPLANE_MODE_CHANGED  1  1   3  
I055 ACTION_MANAGE_NETWORK_USAGE  1     4  
I093 ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED  1     4  
I141 CATEGORY_APP_MARKET  1     4  
A006 android.app.admin.DevicePolicyManager    3    2 
A015 android.app.KeyguardManager 2       3 
A023 android.app.SearchableInfo 1  1 1    2 




A052 android.content.pm.FeatureInfo    2    3 
A087 android.media.AudioTrack   1 2    2 
A113 android.net.TrafficStats   1 1    3 
A121 android.os.ConditionVariable 1  1 1    2 
A133 android.os.Messenger    1    4 
A150 android.preference.ListPreference 1  1 2    1 
A159 android.provider.SearchRecentSuggestions   1     4 
A164 android.speech.RecognitionListener   1     4 
A165 android.speech.SpeechRecognizer   2     3 
A168 android.support.v4.content 1  2 1    1 
A173 android.support.v4.util.DebugUtils   1     4 
A182 android.util.AndroidRuntimeException 1  2 1    1 
A193 android.util.MonthDisplayHelper 1  1     3 
A195 android.util.Patterns 2  1 1    1 
I081 ACTION_PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH       4  
I143 CATEGORY_APP_MUSIC    1   3  
A011 android.app.backup 1   2    1 
A028 android.bluetooth 1  2     1 
A033 android.content.ClipboardManager 1  2     1 
A084 android.media.AsyncPlayer 1  1 1    1 
A089 android.media.ExifInterface   1 1    2 
A107 android.net.LocalSocket 1  1     2 
A155 android.provider.CalendarContract 1  1     2 
I006 ACTION_APP_ERROR  1     2  
I074 ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENT  1  1   1  
I082 ACTION_PACKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED  1  1   1  
I092 ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED  1     2  
I097 ACTION_QUICK_CLOCK  1  1   1  
I114 ACTION_TIME_CHANGED       3  
I146 CATEGORY_CAR_MODE    1   2  
A020 android.app.NativeActivity 1  1     1 
A027 android.app.TaskStackBuilder 1  1 1     
A034 android.content.ClipData 1  1     1 
A095 android.media.MediaScannerConnection    1    2 
A100 android.media.ToneGenerator 1   1    1 
A108 android.net.LocalSocketAddress 1   1    1 
A144 android.os.StrictMode 1  1     1 
A156 android.provider.CallLog.Calls   3      
A179 android.support.v7.app   1 1    1 
I007 ACTION_ASSIST  1     1  
I031 ACTION_DREAMING_STARTED    1   1  
I036 ACTION_FACTORY_TEST 1      1  
I110 ACTION_SHUTDOWN    1   1  
I116 ACTION_TRANSLATE 1      1  
I120 ACTION_UNINSTALL_PACKAGE       2  
I133 CATEGORY_APP_BROWSER    1   1  
I136 CATEGORY_APP_CONTACTS    1   1  
I140 CATEGORY_APP_MAPS 1      1  
I157 CATEGORY_LE_DESK_DOCK  1     1  
I259 FLAG_ACTIVITY_CLEAR_TOP 1 1       
I276 FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP    1   1  
A017 android.app.ListFragment 1       1 
A029 android.content.AbstractThreadedSyncAdapter 1       1 
A048 android.content.Loader 1       1 
A077 android.hardware.GeomagneticField 1       1 
A086 android.media.AudioRecord    1    1 
A104 android.net.http.HttpResponseCache 1       1 
A171 android.support.v4.os.ParcelableCompat   1     1 
A172 android.support.v4.os.ParcelableCompatCreatorCallbacks   1 1     
A187 android.util.EventLog   1     1 
I032 ACTION_DREAMING_STOPPED       1  
I084 ACTION_PACKAGE_NEEDS_VERIFICATION       1  
I089 ACTION_PASTE       1  
I121 ACTION_USER_BACKGROUND    1     
I123 ACTION_USER_INITIALIZE       1  




I137 CATEGORY_APP_EMAIL       1  
I139 CATEGORY_APP_GALLERY       1  
I142 CATEGORY_APP_MESSAGING       1  
I152 CATEGORY_HE_DESK_DOCK 1        
I273 FLAG_ACTIVITY_REORDER_TO_FRONT       1  
A042 android.content.CursorLoader 1        
A090 android.media.FaceDetector    1     
A091 android.media.JetPlayer   1      
A092 android.media.MediaMetadataRetriever    1     
A152 android.preference.RingtonePreference   1      
I122 ACTION_USER_FOREGROUND         
I134 CATEGORY_APP_CALCULATOR         
A072 android.content.SyncResult         
A088 android.media.CamcorderProfile         
A106 android.net.LocalServerSocket         
A162 android.service.dreams.DreamService         
A175 android.support.v4.util.LruCache         
A178 android.support.v4.util.TimeUtils         
A189 android.util.JsonReader         







Heatmap Data of Feature Ranking by Algorithm. 









































































P079 INSTALL_SHORTCUT 4 4 4 4 4  4 4 3 4 4 
P112 RECEIVE_SMS 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 
P139 SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 4 4 3 4 4  4 4 4 4 4 
I078 ACTION_PACKAGE_ADDED 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 1 4 4 
I106 ACTION_SENDTO 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 2 4 4 
P105 READ_SMS 4 4 2 4 4  4 4 4 4 4 
I012 ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 1 4 4 
A111 android.net.Proxy 4 4 4 4 4  4 4 2 4 4 
I153 CATEGORY_HOME 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4  4 4 
A180 android.telephony 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 
P104 READ_PHONE_STATE 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 4 2 4 4 
A022 android.app.PendingIntent 4 4 4 4  2 4 4 2 4 4 
A045 android.content.Intent.ShortcutIconResource 4 4 4 3 3  4 4 2 4 4 
P100 READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 4 4 2 4 4  4 4 1 4 4 
P153 WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 4 4 4   4 4 4 2 4 4 
P005 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 4 4 4   1 3 4 4 4 4 
P010 ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 4 2 4 3 
P008 ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 4 4 4   2 3 4 2 4 4 
A003 android.annotation.TargetApi 4 4 4    4 4 3 4 4 
A025 android.app.Service 4 4 4    4 4 3 4 4 
A051 android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo 4 4 4    4 4 3 4 4 
A055 android.content.pm.PackageInfo 4 4 4   1 4 4 2 4 4 
P004 ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 4 4 4   1 2 4 4 4 3 
P082 KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 4 4 2 4 4  2 4 2 2 2 
A154 android.provider.Browser 4 4 3 1 1  4 4  4 4 
P006 ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS 4 4 2 2 2  2 4 4 2 2 
P110 RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 4 4 3    3 4 2 4 4 
I131 ACTION_WEB_SEARCH 4 4 2 1   4 4 1 4 4 
A046 android.content.IntentFilter 4 4 4    3 4 1 4 4 
A061 android.content.pm.ServiceInfo 4 4 1    4 4 3 4 4 
P099 READ_CONTACTS 4 4 4   2 3 3 1 3 3 
A062 android.content.pm.Signature 4 4 4    4 1 2 4 4 
A128 android.os.IBinder 4 4 4   1 3 4 1 3 3 
P113 RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 4 4     4 4 2 4 4 
I026 ACTION_DELETE 4 4 2   1 4 2 1 4 4 
I079 ACTION_PACKAGE_CHANGED 4 4 2    4 2 2 4 4 
I083 ACTION_PACKAGE_INSTALL 4 4 2    4 4  4 4 
I090 ACTION_PICK 3 3 4    4 4  4 4 
A039 android.content.ContentUris 4 4 2    3 4 2 4 3 
A116 android.net.wifi 4 4 4 1 2  1 4 2 2 2 
A134 android.os.Parcel 3 3 4    4 3 1 4 4 
A191 android.util.Log 4 1 4   3 4 2  4 4 
P045 BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 3 3 2    4 2 3 4 4 
P053 CALL_PHONE 4 4 3   1 1 4 4 2 2 
P061 CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 4 4 2    3 4 2 3 3 
I085 ACTION_PACKAGE_REMOVED 4 4 4   1 2 4  3 3 
I086 ACTION_PACKAGE_REPLACED 4 4 2    4 2 1 4 4 
A004 android.app.ActivityManager 4 4 4 1 1  1 4 2 2 2 
A032 android.content.BroadcastReceiver 4 4 4    1 4 2 3 3 
A130 android.os.Looper 4 4 4    2 4 3 2 2 
P111 RECEIVE_MMS 4 4     4 2 2 4 4 
P147 VIBRATE 4 4 4   2 1 4 1 2 2 




I029 ACTION_DIAL 4 4 4   1 1 4 2 2 2 
I105 ACTION_SEND 3 4 4   2 1 4 2 2 2 
I159 CATEGORY_OPENABLE 3 3 2   1 4 2 1 4 4 
A194 android.util.Pair 4 4 4    1 4  3 4 
P069 EXPAND_STATUS_BAR 4 4     3 2 3 3 4 
I044 ACTION_INSERT_OR_EDIT 3 2 2    4 2 2 4 4 
I124 ACTION_USER_PRESENT 1 2 4    4 4  4 4 
I126 ACTION_VIEW 4 4 4   1 1 3 1 3 2 
I144 CATEGORY_BROWSABLE 2 3 2    3 4 2 4 3 
A024 android.app.SearchManager 4 4 1    4  2 4 4 
A073 android.content.UriMatcher 4 4 2    2 4 3 2 2 
A075 android.hardware.Camera 3 3 4    2 2 3 3 3 
A085 android.media.AudioManager 1 2 4    3 4 1 4 4 
A101 android.net.ConnectivityManager 4 4 2    2 4 3 2 2 
P134 SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS 4 4     3 2 2 4 3 
P148 WAKE_LOCK 4 4 4   1 1 4 2 1 1 
I101 ACTION_SCREEN_OFF 1 1 4   2 3 4 2 3 2 
A021 android.app.Notification 4 4 3 3 2   4 1 1  
A030 android.content.ActivityNotFoundException 1 3 4   3 1 4 2 2 2 
A047 android.content.IntentSender 4 3     4 1 2 4 4 
A064 android.content.res.AssetManager 4 4 4    1 4  3 2 
A120 android.os.CancellationSignal 4 4     4 1 1 4 4 
A135 android.os.Parcelable 1 2 2    4 3 2 4 4 
A151 android.preference.Preference  1 4   4 2 4  4 3 
A176 android.support.v4.util.SimpleArrayMap 4 4     4 1 1 4 4 
P044 BLUETOOTH 1 1 2    4 2 3 4 4 
P058 CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 3 4 2    2 2 4 2 2 
P062 CLEAR_APP_CACHE 4 4 1    3 2 2 2 3 
P081 INTERNET 4 3 4   1 1 2 2 2 2 
P088 MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS 3 3 2    3 2 2 3 3 
I091 ACTION_PICK_ACTIVITY 3 3 2    3 1 3 2 4 
I130 ACTION_WALLPAPER_CHANGED 4 4 2    2 2 4 1 2 
I154 CATEGORY_INFO 2 2 2    4 2 1 4 4 
I158 CATEGORY_MONKEY 3 3 1    4 2 2 2 4 
A040 android.content.ContentValues 4 4 4   4  4 1   
A068 android.content.res.XmlResourceParser 4 4 3     4 2 2 2 
A081 android.location.Geocoder 4 4 2  1  2 4  2 2 
A197 android.util.SparseBooleanArray 4 3     4  2 4 4 
P059 CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 4 4 2    2 2 2 2 2 
P114 RECORD_AUDIO 4 4 2    1 4 3 1 1 
I022 ACTION_CREATE_SHORTCUT 4 4 2    1 3 1 3 2 
I102 ACTION_SCREEN_ON 4 4 2    2 3 1 2 2 
I108 ACTION_SET_WALLPAPER 4 4 2    3 1 1 2 3 
A056 android.content.pm.PackageManager   4    4 4  4 4 
A093 android.media.MediaPlayer 3 3 4     4 2 3 1 
A127 android.os.Handler   4    3 4 1 4 4 
A143 android.os.StatFs 4 4 4    1 3 1 2 1 
P050 BROADCAST_STICKY 1 1 2    4 2 2 3 4 
P074 GET_PACKAGE_SIZE 3 4     3 2 2 2 3 
P156 WRITE_SETTINGS 4 4 3    1 2 2 2 1 
I010 ACTION_BATTERY_LOW 1 1 2    4 2 1 4 4 
I011 ACTION_BATTERY_OKAY 1 1 1    4 1 3 4 4 
I014 ACTION_CALL 4 4 4   1 1 2  2 1 
I019 ACTION_CLOSE_SYSTEM_DIALOGS 3 3 2    2 2 2 3 2 
I023 ACTION_DATE_CHANGED 2 2 2    4 2 2 2 3 
I147 CATEGORY_DEFAULT 1 1 4   1 2 4 1 3 2 
A007 android.app.AlarmManager 4 4 4  1   4 2   
A008 android.app.AlertDialog   4   1 2 4 3 2 3 
A037 android.content.ContentProvider   3    4 3 1 4 4 
A110 android.net.NetworkInfo 4 4 4     4 3   
A125 android.os.Environment 4 4 4   1  4  1 1 
A186 android.util.DisplayMetrics 4 4 4   1  4 2   
A202 android.util.Xml.Encoding 4 2     4  1 4 4 
P133 SET_WALLPAPER 4 4 2    1 2 3 1 1 
I058 ACTION_MEDIA_BUTTON 2 2 2    3 2 1 3 3 




A060 android.content.pm.ResolveInfo 2 3 4    2 3  2 2 
A066 android.content.res.Configuration 2 3 4   4  4 1   
A079 android.location.Address 4 4 2    1 4 3   
A132 android.os.Message 4 4 4   1  4 1   
A137 android.os.PowerManager 4 4 4     4 2   
A148 android.preference.DialogPreference 2 3 1    3  2 4 3 
P067 DISABLE_KEYGUARD 2 2     2 2 4 3 2 
P092 NFC 1 1     4 1 2 4 4 
P115 REORDER_TASKS 1 1     4 1 2 4 4 
P125 SET_ALARM 4 4     2 2 2 1 2 
P157 WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS 1 1 1    4 1 1 4 4 
I033 ACTION_EDIT 1 1 2   1 1 4 3 2 2 
I037 ACTION_GET_CONTENT 1 1 4   2  3 1 3 2 
I103 ACTION_SEARCH 1 1 4   2 1 3 1 2 2 
I104 ACTION_SEARCH_LONG_PRESS 2 2 2    3 1 1 3 3 
I150 CATEGORY_EMBED 1 2 1    3 2 2 3 3 
I155 CATEGORY_LAUNCHER 3 1 4    2 2 1 2 2 
A014 android.app.IntentService 4 4 4     4 1   
A080 android.location.Criteria 4 4 4     4 1   
A083 android.location.Location   4    2 4 1 3 3 
A094 android.media.MediaRecorder 4 4 1    1 3 1 2 1 
A123 android.os.DeadObjectException 4 4     3  2 2 2 
A138 android.os.Process 4 4 4     3 1 1  
A146 android.os.Vibrator 1 1 4   4 1 3 1 1 1 
A157 android.provider.Contacts 1 1 4    1 4 2 3 1 
A158 android.provider.MediaStore 3 4 2    1 4 1 1 1 
A161 android.sax 3 2     4   4 4 
A201 android.util.Xml 4 4 4     1 4   
P055 CAMERA 1 1 4   1 1 3 3 1 1 
P106 READ_SYNC_SETTINGS 1 1 1    4 1 2 3 3 
I049 ACTION_MAIN 3 1 4    2 1  2 3 
I065 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_SCAN_FILE 2 2 2    1 2 3 2 2 
A010 android.app.Application 1 3 4   4  4    
A031 android.content.AsyncQueryHandler 4 4     2  2 2 2 
A038 android.content.ContentResolver 1 3 4     4 2 2  
A043 android.content.DialogInterface   4    2 4 2 2 2 
A071 android.content.SharedPreferences 4 4 4     2 2   
A118 android.os.Binder  1 2    1 4 1 4 3 
A160 android.provider.Settings 4 4 4     4    
P028 BIND_INPUT_METHOD 1 1     4 1 2 3 3 
P060 CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE 1 1     4 1 1 3 4 
I018 ACTION_CHOOSER 3 2 1    3 1 2 1 2 
I043 ACTION_INSERT 1 2 2    3 2 1 2 2 
I094 ACTION_POWER_USAGE_SUMMARY 2 2 2    2 1 3 2 1 
I096 ACTION_PROVIDER_CHANGED 2 2 2    2 1 1 3 2 
I111 ACTION_SYNC 3 2 2    2 1 1 2 2 
A019 android.app.LocalActivityManager       4  3 4 4 
A053 android.content.pm.IPackageStatsObserver       4  3 4 4 
A063 android.content.res.AssetFileDescriptor 1 1 4    2 1 1 3 2 
A078 android.hardware.Sensor 3 4 4     3 1   
P015 BATTERY_STATS 1 1     3 2 1 2 4 
P072 GET_ACCOUNTS 1 2 2   1 1 3 2 1 1 
I060 ACTION_MEDIA_EJECT   2    3 2 3 1 3 
I066 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_STARTED 2 2 2    2 2 2 1 1 
I080 ACTION_PACKAGE_DATA_CLEARED 2 2 2    2 2  2 2 
I107 ACTION_SEND_MULTIPLE 1 1 2    2 4 1 2 1 
I113 ACTION_TIMEZONE_CHANGED 1 2 2    2 2 1 2 2 
I132 CATEGORY_ALTERNATIVE 1 1 2    3 1 2 2 2 
A067 android.content.res.Resources   4   1 1 4 1 2 1 
A136 android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor       4  2 4 4 
A141 android.os.ResultReceiver 4 3     2 1 1 1 2 
A177 android.support.v4.util.SparseArrayCompat   1    4  1 4 4 
A196 android.util.SparseArray   2   1 1 3 2 2 3 
A200 android.util.TypedValue  1 4     4 3 2  
P043 BIND_WALLPAPER 2 2 2    1 2 1 2 1 




P097 READ_CALENDAR 2 2 1    1 2 3 1 1 
P150 WRITE_CALENDAR 1 1 2    1 2 2 2 2 
P152 WRITE_CONTACTS 1 1 2   1 1 2 3 1 1 
I129 ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND 2 2 2    2 1 2  2 
I160 CATEGORY_PREFERENCE 2 2 1    2 1 3 1 1 
A016 android.app.LauncherActivity       4  1 4 4 
A044 android.content.Entity       4  1 4 4 
A097 android.media.Ringtone 3 2 1    2 1 2 1 1 
A109 android.net.MailTo       4  2 3 4 
A112 android.net.SSLCertificateSocketFactory       4  3 3 3 
A114 android.net.Uri 4 3 3     1 2   
A115 android.net.UrlQuerySanitizer       4  3 2 4 
A129 android.os.IInterface 1 2 2     4 1 2 1 
A139 android.os.RemoteCallbackList       4  4 2 3 
A140 android.os.RemoteException  1 4    2 4 2   
A170 android.support.v4.os.EnvironmentCompat 4 4     2  1  2 
P025 BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN 1 1 1    2 1 2 2 2 
P107 READ_SYNC_STATS 1 1     3 1 3 1 2 
P151 WRITE_CALL_LOG 1 1     2 1 3 2 2 
I008 ACTION_ATTACH_DATA 2 2 1    1 1 2 1 2 
I015 ACTION_CALL_BUTTON 2 1 1    3 1 1 1 2 
I064 ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_FINISHED 2 2 2    1 2 1 1 1 
I087 ACTION_PACKAGE_RESTARTED 1 1 2    2 1 1 1 3 
I100 ACTION_RUN 2 2 2    2 1  1 2 
A005 android.app.admin.DeviceAdminReceiver       4  1 4 3 
A036 android.content.ComponentName 1 1 4     4 1 1  
A059 android.content.pm.ProviderInfo 1 2     3   3 3 
A074 android.database 1 1 4     4  1 1 
A082 android.location.Gps 1 1     3   3 4 
A119 android.os.Build 1 1 4     4 2   
A145 android.os.SystemClock 1 1 4     4 2   
A147 android.preference.CheckBoxPreference   3    2  1 3 3 
A203 android.webkit   4   1  4 1 1 1 
P016 BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE 1 1     2 1 2 2 2 
P034 BIND_REMOTEVIEWS 1 1     2 1 2 2 2 
P064 DELETE_CACHE_FILES 1 1     3 1 1 2 2 
I002 ACTION_ALL_APPS 2 2 2    1 1 3   
I016 ACTION_CAMERA_BUTTON 2 1 1    2 1 1 1 2 
I020 ACTION_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED 1 2 1    1 2 1 2 1 




1 1 2    2 2 1 1 1 
I042 ACTION_INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED 2 2 1    2 1 1 1 1 
I062 ACTION_MEDIA_NOFS 1 1     3 1 3 1 1 
I069 ACTION_MEDIA_UNMOUNTED 1 1 2    1 2 1 2 1 
I099 ACTION_REBOOT 2 1 2    1 1 2 1 1 
I115 ACTION_TIME_TICK 1 1 1    1 2 3 1 1 
I161 CATEGORY_SAMPLE_CODE 2 2 1    2 1 1 1 1 
A054 android.content.pm.LabeledIntent 4 4     2  1   
A070 android.content.ServiceConnection  1 3     4 3   
A117 android.nfc       3  2 2 4 
A124 android.os.Debug   4    1  2 2 2 
A153 android.provider.BaseColumns 4 4      1 2   
A163 android.service.wallpaper.WallpaperService   3    3 1 1 2 1 
P076 GLOBAL_SEARCH 1 1     3 1 2 1 1 




1 1 2    1 2 1 1 1 
I041 ACTION_HEADSET_PLUG   2    1 2 2 2 1 
I047 ACTION_LOCALE_CHANGED 1 1     2 1 1 2 2 
I057 ACTION_MEDIA_BAD_REMOVAL 1 1     2 1 1 2 2 
I063 ACTION_MEDIA_REMOVED 1 1     2 2 2 1 1 
I117 ACTION_UID_REMOVED 2 2 1    1 1 2  1 
I163 CATEGORY_SELECTED_ALTERNATIVE 2 2 1    1 1 1 1 1 
I164 CATEGORY_TAB 3 2 1    1 1 1  1 




A009 android.app.AlertDialog.Builder   4     4 2   
A026 android.app.TabActivity   4    1 1 1 2 1 
A057 android.content.pm.PackageStats 2 3     1  2 1 1 
A105 android.net.http.SslCertificate       3  3 2 2 
A126 android.os.FileObserver       4   2 4 
A169 android.support.v4.media.TransportMediator       4  3  3 
A188 android.util.FloatMath   4     2  2 2 
A199 android.util.StateSet 1 1     2   3 3 
I009 ACTION_BATTERY_CHANGED   3   1  2 1 1 1 
I046 ACTION_INSTALL_PACKAGE 1 1     2  3 1 1 
I056 ACTION_MANAGE_PACKAGE_STORAGE 2 2 1    1 1 1  1 
I068 ACTION_MEDIA_UNMOUNTABLE 2 2 1    1 1 1  1 
I070 ACTION_MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED 1 1     2 1 1 1 2 
I112 ACTION_SYSTEM_TUTORIAL 2 2 2     1 2   
I119 ACTION_UMS_DISCONNECTED 2 2 2    1 1   1 
I149 CATEGORY_DEVELOPMENT_PREFERENCE 2 2 1    1 1 1  1 
I167 CATEGORY_UNIT_TEST 2 2 1     1 3   
A001 android.accounts   1    2 4 1  1 
A012 android.app.DownloadManager 1 2     3   1 2 
A069 android.content.SearchRecentSuggestionsProvider 1      1  4 1 2 
A185 android.util.Config 3 1     2   1 2 
P012 ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION 1 1     1 1 3  1 
P013 ADD_VOICEMAIL 1 1     1 1 3  1 
P041 BIND_VPN_SERVICE 1 1     1 1 3  1 
P098 READ_CALL_LOG 1 1     1 1 1 1 2 
P146 USE_SIP 1 1 1    1 1 2  1 
I013 ACTION_BUG_REPORT 2 2 1    1 1 1   
I059 ACTION_MEDIA_CHECKING 1 1     1 1 2 1 1 
I067 ACTION_MEDIA_SHARED 1 1     1 1 2 1 1 
I073 ACTION_NEW_OUTGOING_CALL   2    1 2 1 1 1 
I118 ACTION_UMS_CONNECTED 2 1 1    1 1  1 1 




2 2 1     1 2   
I165 CATEGORY_TEST 2 2 1    1 1   1 
A035 android.content.ComponentCallbacks       1 3 2 1 1 
A049 android.content.OperationApplicationException 3 2 1      1 1  
A076 android.hardware.display.DisplayManager 3 4        1  
A096 android.media.RemoteControlClient 3 4       1   
A098 android.media.SoundPool 1 1 4     1 1   
A142 android.os.ServiceManager 1 3     1  1 1 1 
A166 android.speech.tts.TextToSpeech 3 1     1  1 1 1 
A181 android.util.AndroidException 1 1     2  1 1 2 
A183 android.util.AttributeSet   4     4    
A184 android.util.Base64 1 2 2     2 1   
A198 android.util.SparseIntArray 1      2  1 2 2 
P031 BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE 1 1     1 1 2  1 
P037 BIND_TEXT_SERVICE 1 1      1 3  1 
P094 PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS 1 1     1 1 1 1 1 
I030 ACTION_DOCK_EVENT 1 1     1 1 1 1 1 
A013 android.app.Instrumentation 1 1     2  1 1 1 
A018 android.app.LoaderManager 1        4 1 1 
A050 android.content.pm.ActivityInfo   2     3 2   
A058 android.content.pm.PermissionInfo       1  3 2 1 
A065 android.content.res.ColorStateList       1 1 1 2 2 
A099 android.media.ThumbnailUtils       2  3 1 1 
A102 android.net.DhcpInfo 1 1     2  1 1 1 
A167 android.support.v4.app       1 4 2   
I028 ACTION_DEVICE_STORAGE_OK 1 1     1 1 1  1 
I145 CATEGORY_CAR_DOCK 1 1     1  1 1 1 
A103 android.net.http.AndroidHttpClient       2  1 1 2 
A122 android.os.CountDownTimer       2   2 2 
A131 android.os.MemoryFile 1 1     1  2  1 
A149 android.preference.EditTextPreference   3      3   
A174 android.support.v4.util.LogWriter       2  1 2 1 




I001 ACTION_AIRPLANE_MODE_CHANGED 1 1       3   
I055 ACTION_MANAGE_NETWORK_USAGE 1 1     1  1  1 
I093 ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED 1 1       2  1 
I141 CATEGORY_APP_MARKET       1  2 1 1 
A006 android.app.admin.DevicePolicyManager       1  1 1 2 
A015 android.app.KeyguardManager   1    1 1 1 1  
A023 android.app.SearchableInfo 3 1       1   
A041 android.content.ContextWrapper   2    2  1   
A052 android.content.pm.FeatureInfo       2   1 2 
A087 android.media.AudioTrack   1    1  1 2  
A113 android.net.TrafficStats   1    2  1 1  
A121 android.os.ConditionVariable       1  4   
A133 android.os.Messenger       2  1 1 1 
A150 android.preference.ListPreference   4      1   
A159 android.provider.SearchRecentSuggestions       1  1 2 1 
A164 android.speech.RecognitionListener       2  1 1 1 
A165 android.speech.SpeechRecognizer       2  1  2 
A168 android.support.v4.content        1 1 3  
A173 android.support.v4.util.DebugUtils       1  2 1 1 
A182 android.util.AndroidRuntimeException        4 1   
A193 android.util.MonthDisplayHelper       1  3  1 
A195 android.util.Patterns       2  3   
I081 ACTION_PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH 1 1     1    1 
I143 CATEGORY_APP_MUSIC       1  2  1 
A011 android.app.backup       3    1 
A028 android.bluetooth       1  3   
A033 android.content.ClipboardManager       1  3   
A084 android.media.AsyncPlayer         3 1  
A089 android.media.ExifInterface       1  1 1 1 
A107 android.net.LocalSocket 1        1 2  
A155 android.provider.CalendarContract       1  2  1 
A106 android.net.LocalServerSocket       1  1 1 1 
I006 ACTION_APP_ERROR       1  2   
I074 ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENT         3   
I082 ACTION_PACKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED       1  2   
I092 ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED         2  1 
I097 ACTION_QUICK_CLOCK         3   
I114 ACTION_TIME_CHANGED       1  1  1 
I146 CATEGORY_CAR_MODE       1  1  1 
A020 android.app.NativeActivity         3   
A027 android.app.TaskStackBuilder         3   
A034 android.content.ClipData       1  2   
A095 android.media.MediaScannerConnection 1 1       1   
A100 android.media.ToneGenerator         3   
A108 android.net.LocalSocketAddress 1        2   
A144 android.os.StrictMode         3   
A156 android.provider.CallLog.Calls       1   1 1 
A179 android.support.v7.app         3   
I007 ACTION_ASSIST         2   
I031 ACTION_DREAMING_STARTED         2   
I036 ACTION_FACTORY_TEST         2   
I110 ACTION_SHUTDOWN         2   
I116 ACTION_TRANSLATE         2   
I120 ACTION_UNINSTALL_PACKAGE 1        1   
I133 CATEGORY_APP_BROWSER         2   
I136 CATEGORY_APP_CONTACTS         2   
I140 CATEGORY_APP_MAPS         2   
I157 CATEGORY_LE_DESK_DOCK         2   
I259 FLAG_ACTIVITY_CLEAR_TOP         2   
I276 FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP         2   
A017 android.app.ListFragment         2   
A029 android.content.AbstractThreadedSyncAdapter       1  1   
A048 android.content.Loader         2   
A077 android.hardware.GeomagneticField       1  1   
A086 android.media.AudioRecord         2   








        2   
A187 android.util.EventLog         2   
I032 ACTION_DREAMING_STOPPED         1   
I084 ACTION_PACKAGE_NEEDS_VERIFICATION         1   
I089 ACTION_PASTE         1   
I121 ACTION_USER_BACKGROUND         1   
I123 ACTION_USER_INITIALIZE         1   
I135 CATEGORY_APP_CALENDAR         1   
I137 CATEGORY_APP_EMAIL         1   
I139 CATEGORY_APP_GALLERY         1   
I142 CATEGORY_APP_MESSAGING         1   
I152 CATEGORY_HE_DESK_DOCK         1   
I273 FLAG_ACTIVITY_REORDER_TO_FRONT         1   
A042 android.content.CursorLoader         1   
A090 android.media.FaceDetector         1   
A091 android.media.JetPlayer         1   
A092 android.media.MediaMetadataRetriever         1   
A152 android.preference.RingtonePreference         1   
A088 android.media.CamcorderProfile         1   
A190 android.util.JsonWriter         1   
A072 android.content.SyncResult            
A162 android.service.dreams.DreamService            
A175 android.support.v4.util.LruCache            
A178 android.support.v4.util.TimeUtils            
A189 android.util.JsonReader            
I122 ACTION_USER_FOREGROUND            


























Top 200 Permissions, Intents and API Calls 
# Feature Type Feature Name 
1 Permission INSTALL_SHORTCUT 
2 Permission RECEIVE_SMS 
3 Permission SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 
4 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_ADDED 
5 Intent ACTION_SENDTO 
6 Permission READ_SMS 
7 Intent ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED 
8 API Call android.net.Proxy 
9 Intent CATEGORY_HOME 
10 API Call android.telephony 
11 Permission READ_PHONE_STATE 
12 API Call android.app.PendingIntent 
13 API Call android.content.Intent.ShortcutIconResource 
14 Permission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
15 Permission WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
16 Permission ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 
17 Permission ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
18 Permission ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
19 API Call android.annotation.TargetApi 
20 API Call android.app.Service 
21 API Call android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo 
22 API Call android.content.pm.PackageInfo 
23 Permission ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
24 Permission KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 
25 API Call android.provider.Browser 
26 Permission ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS 
27 Permission RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
28 Intent ACTION_WEB_SEARCH 
29 API Call android.content.IntentFilter 
30 API Call android.content.pm.ServiceInfo 
31 Permission READ_CONTACTS 
32 API Call android.content.pm.Signature 
33 API Call android.os.IBinder 
34 Permission RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 
35 Intent ACTION_DELETE 
36 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_CHANGED 
37 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_INSTALL 
38 Intent ACTION_PICK 




40 API Call android.net.wifi 
41 API Call android.os.Parcel 
42 API Call android.util.Log 
43 Permission BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 
44 Permission CALL_PHONE 
45 Permission CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 
46 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_REMOVED 
47 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_REPLACED 
48 API Call android.app.ActivityManager 
49 API Call android.content.BroadcastReceiver 
50 API Call android.os.Looper 
51 Permission RECEIVE_MMS 
52 Permission VIBRATE 
53 Intent ACTION_DEVICE_STORAGE_LOW 
54 Intent ACTION_DIAL 
55 Intent ACTION_SEND 
56 Intent CATEGORY_OPENABLE 
57 API Call android.util.Pair 
58 Permission EXPAND_STATUS_BAR 
59 Intent ACTION_INSERT_OR_EDIT 
60 Intent ACTION_USER_PRESENT 
61 Intent ACTION_VIEW 
62 Intent CATEGORY_BROWSABLE 
63 API Call android.app.SearchManager 
64 API Call android.content.UriMatcher 
65 API Call android.hardware.Camera 
66 API Call android.media.AudioManager 
67 API Call android.net.ConnectivityManager 
68 Permission SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS 
69 Permission WAKE_LOCK 
70 Intent ACTION_SCREEN_OFF 
71 API Call android.app.Notification 
72 API Call android.content.ActivityNotFoundException 
73 API Call android.content.IntentSender 
74 API Call android.content.res.AssetManager 
75 API Call android.os.CancellationSignal 
76 API Call android.os.Parcelable 
77 API Call android.preference.Preference 
78 API Call android.support.v4.util.SimpleArrayMap 
79 Permission BLUETOOTH 
80 Permission CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 
81 Permission CLEAR_APP_CACHE 
82 Permission INTERNET 




84 Intent ACTION_PICK_ACTIVITY 
85 Intent ACTION_WALLPAPER_CHANGED 
86 Intent CATEGORY_INFO 
87 Intent CATEGORY_MONKEY 
88 API Call android.content.ContentValues 
89 API Call android.content.res.XmlResourceParser 
90 API Call android.location.Geocoder 
91 API Call android.util.SparseBooleanArray 
92 Permission CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 
93 Permission RECORD_AUDIO 
94 Intent ACTION_CREATE_SHORTCUT 
95 Intent ACTION_SCREEN_ON 
96 Intent ACTION_SET_WALLPAPER 
97 API Call android.content.pm.PackageManager 
98 API Call android.media.MediaPlayer 
99 API Call android.os.Handler 
100 API Call android.os.StatFs 
101 Permission BROADCAST_STICKY 
102 Permission GET_PACKAGE_SIZE 
103 Permission WRITE_SETTINGS 
104 Intent ACTION_BATTERY_LOW 
105 Intent ACTION_BATTERY_OKAY 
106 Intent ACTION_CALL 
107 Intent ACTION_CLOSE_SYSTEM_DIALOGS 
108 Intent ACTION_DATE_CHANGED 
109 Intent CATEGORY_DEFAULT 
110 API Call android.app.AlarmManager 
111 API Call android.app.AlertDialog 
112 API Call android.content.ContentProvider 
113 API Call android.net.NetworkInfo 
114 API Call android.os.Environment 
115 API Call android.util.DisplayMetrics 
116 API Call android.util.Xml.Encoding 
117 Permission SET_WALLPAPER 
118 Intent ACTION_MEDIA_BUTTON 
119 Intent ACTION_MEDIA_MOUNTED 
120 API Call android.content.pm.ResolveInfo 
121 API Call android.content.res.Configuration 
122 API Call android.location.Address 
123 API Call android.os.Message 
124 API Call android.os.PowerManager 
125 API Call android.preference.DialogPreference 
126 Permission DISABLE_KEYGUARD 




128 Permission REORDER_TASKS 
129 Permission SET_ALARM 
130 Permission WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS 
131 Intent ACTION_EDIT 
132 Intent ACTION_GET_CONTENT 
133 Intent ACTION_SEARCH 
134 Intent ACTION_SEARCH_LONG_PRESS 
135 Intent CATEGORY_EMBED 
136 Intent CATEGORY_LAUNCHER 
137 API Call android.app.IntentService 
138 API Call android.location.Criteria 
139 API Call android.location.Location 
140 API Call android.media.MediaRecorder 
141 API Call android.os.DeadObjectException 
142 API Call android.os.Process 
143 API Call android.os.Vibrator 
144 API Call android.provider.Contacts 
145 API Call android.provider.MediaStore 
146 API Call android.sax 
147 API Call android.util.Xml 
148 Permission CAMERA 
149 Permission READ_SYNC_SETTINGS 
150 Intent ACTION_MAIN 
151 Intent ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_SCAN_FILE 
152 API Call android.app.Application 
153 API Call android.content.AsyncQueryHandler 
154 API Call android.content.ContentResolver 
155 API Call android.content.DialogInterface 
156 API Call android.content.SharedPreferences 
157 API Call android.os.Binder 
158 API Call android.provider.Settings 
159 Permission BIND_INPUT_METHOD 
160 Permission CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE 
161 Intent ACTION_CHOOSER 
162 Intent ACTION_INSERT 
163 Intent ACTION_POWER_USAGE_SUMMARY 
164 Intent ACTION_PROVIDER_CHANGED 
165 Intent ACTION_SYNC 
166 API Call android.app.LocalActivityManager 
167 API Call android.content.pm.IPackageStatsObserver 
168 API Call android.content.res.AssetFileDescriptor 
169 API Call android.hardware.Sensor 
170 Permission BATTERY_STATS 




172 Intent ACTION_MEDIA_EJECT 
173 Intent ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_STARTED 
174 Intent ACTION_PACKAGE_DATA_CLEARED 
175 Intent ACTION_SEND_MULTIPLE 
176 Intent ACTION_TIMEZONE_CHANGED 
177 Intent CATEGORY_ALTERNATIVE 
178 API Call android.content.res.Resources 
179 API Call android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor 
180 API Call android.os.ResultReceiver 
181 API Call android.support.v4.util.SparseArrayCompat 
182 API Call android.util.SparseArray 
183 API Call android.util.TypedValue 
184 Permission BIND_WALLPAPER 
185 Permission PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 
186 Permission READ_CALENDAR 
187 Permission WRITE_CALENDAR 
188 Permission WRITE_CONTACTS 
189 Intent ACTION_VOICE_COMMAND 
190 Intent CATEGORY_PREFERENCE 
191 API Call android.app.LauncherActivity 
192 API Call android.content.Entity 
193 API Call android.media.Ringtone 
194 API Call android.net.MailTo 
195 API Call android.net.SSLCertificateSocketFactory 
196 API Call android.net.Uri 
197 API Call android.net.UrlQuerySanitizer 
198 API Call android.os.IInterface 
199 API Call android.os.RemoteCallbackList 
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